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TITLE VII INTERPRETATION AND
ENFORCEMENT IN THE REAGAN
YEARS (1980-89): THE WINDING
ROAD TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1991
BY WILLIAM A. Wnms*
INTRODUCTION
Not waiting for such changes to become law, the Reagan Admin-
istration in its first year in office began using executive powers to
dismantle the government machinery protecting women against
sex discrimination in employment and education. Budget cuts
slashed long-standing government services vital to women and
families ....
-Betty Friedan (1981)1
* William A. Wines is Professor and Chairman of the Management Department, College
of Business, Boise State University, Boise, Idaho 83725. J.D., University of Michigan 1974;
B.S.B.A. with distinction, Northwestern University, 1967. He is admitted to practice in both
Minnesota and the State of Washington. His private practice for a number of years centered
around employment law. His research appears in the Arizona Law Review, the Journal of
Business Ethics, the Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, the Labor Law Jour-
nal and the Gonzaga Law Review among others.
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1. BE=-y FRiYDAN, THE SEcoND STAGE 237-38 (1981).
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What impact did the politics of Ronald Reagan and George Bush
have on the interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act? 2 This Article
addresses that question by examining the political statements, enforce-
ment budgets, federal court decisions, and changes in personnel on the
federal bench during the eight years of the two Reagan administrations.
One outcome of the Reagan-Bush policies was the Civil Rights Act of
1991,1 which reversed some of the Rehnquist Court's rulings limiting a
plaintiff's access to relief in employment discrimination cases.
Ronald Reagan's two terms as President provided him the opportu-
nity to reshape the federal judiciary, which, in turn, began to re-examine
the principles underlying Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.4 More
than any other president before him, Ronald Reagan sought to screen
his nominees for ideological purity;5 by 1991 the law of employment dis-
crimination substantially reflected the values of the new and more con-
servative jurists whom he and his heir apparent had appointed.
However, even after George Bush's four years in the White House, the
political rhetoric still obscures some less dramatic but very effective as-
saults by the Reagan and Bush administrations on affirmative action.
These assaults in the areas of budgets and administrative policies, as sug-
gested by Ms. Friedan, have had a significant impact on the quality of life
and justice in this country even as coverage of them in the popular press
and scholarly journals continues to be modest.6
The first substantial judicial modification of equal employment op-
portunity law came at the end of the Reagan era in two cases: Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust7 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.8
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1976).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1976).
5. See, e.g., D.G. SAVAGE, TURNING RiGHT: TE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME
COURT (1992); Ted Gest, Inside Rehnquist's Court, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 8,1990, at
32-35; Bernard Weintraub, Reagan Says He'll Use Vacancies to Discourage Judicial Activism,
N.Y. Timns, Oct. 22, 1985, at Al; Stephen Wermiel, Some Reagan Judicial Appointees Fail to
Follow Conservative Path Expected by Administration, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1988, at 60; Tom
Wicker, Splendid for Starters, N.Y. TimS, May 6, 1986, at A31.
6. Perhaps the riots in Los Angeles in May 1992 following the not-guilty verdict in the
Rodney King police brutality trial will bring more national scrutiny to the impact of hopeless-
ness on the lives of women and people of color. It is too early to say whether our national
attention span will entertain serious inquiries. Similar questions about our national progress
in employment of women might be raised after national news programs spotlighted sexual
harassment at the Navy's Tailhook Association meeting in June 1992. This Week with David
Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 1992).
7. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
8. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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Sandra Day O'Connor, the first Reagan appointee to the Supreme
Court, wrote a plurality opinion in Watson, which was then endorsed by
a majority of the Court a year later in Wards Cove when Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the last Reagan appointee, provided the decisive fifth vote.
The impact of these decisions, discussed later in this article,9 was to blur
the established distinctions between disparate treatment and disparate
impact cases. The cases seemed to be an initial move toward re-exami-
nation of the entire doctrine of disparate impact and the statistical case,
which had been announced by a unanimous court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.'0 This maneuver was stymied by congressional renunciation
of the Watson and Wards Cove decisions in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.11
The more-than-eight-year lag between the first inauguration of Ron-
ald Reagan and the first significant Supreme Court assault on Title VII
should alert future presidents that the implementation of policy changes
through personnel changes in the judiciary is a long, slow process.12 We
can compare U.S. government policy changes to the navigation of a su-
pertanker. 3 One does not see the results of any effort to back water or
change course for a considerable time. Yet, like a supertanker's change
of direction, when the course correction has been implemented by a shift
in judicial staffing, it may take decades to see the full effect. In the
1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt experienced frustrations similar
to those Reagan must have felt when an entrenched probusiness, con-
servative Supreme Court repeatedly invalidated parts of FDR's New
Deal legislation for revitalizing the U.S. economy. 14
9. See infra notes 97-306 and accompanying text.
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1074-76 (amending 42
U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1976)).
12. For instance, a Justice Department spokesperson responded to a setback in advancing
the Reagan-Meese-Reynolds agenda by saying that what the administration needed to help its
program was "a justice or two" - a reference to some changes in personnel on the Supreme
Court. See infra text accompanying notes 25-96.
13. Anyone interested in how difficult it is to stop or even turn one of the huge supertank-
ers should read a detailed account of the Exxon Valdez accident on Prince William Sound,
Alaska. At a top speed of 15-16 knots, an ultra-large crude oil carrier takes three miles and
twenty minutes to stop. See Abe Dane, America's Oil Tanker Mess, POPULAR MECHANCS,
Nov. 1989, at 52. When the Exxon Valdez ran aground on the rocks in Prince William Sound,
it was traveling at approximately 12 knots. Id. at 51. Nearly 11 million gallons of crude oil
spilled into the sound on March 24, 1989. Id. at 52. The crude oil burst from the hull with
enough force to create a wave three feet high. Id. at 51.
14. William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death,
1985 DuKE L.J. 673.
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In 1985, Professor Lawrence Tribe of Harvard, an experienced Court
watcher and constitutional law specialist, wrote a book on the historical
impact of Supreme Court Justice selection that offered slight hope to
liberals distraught at the thought of four more years.'5 After reciting
William Rehnquist's 1984 dictum that Justices come to the Court "one at
a time" and are swallowed up by the institution,16 Tribe said that in many
ways even one Justice can make a crucial difference in American life.'7
Approximately 20% of the Supreme Court's decisions from 1974 to 1984
were decided by only one vote.'
Yet looking at the court in 1985, Tribe declared that "[a]ny Court as
delicately balanced as that of the 1980s is capable of being thrown
squarely to one side of the ideological divide by an appointment that
upsets still narrow margins on key questions."' 9 Since that comment,
four conservative Justices have taken seats on the Court: Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas. If one
appointment could throw the Court across an ideological divide, four
ought to cement its place in a conservative pantheon. However, as Tribe
also suggested, the complexity of individual personalities sometimes
makes generalities difficult.2 ° Tribe supported this observation by re-
viewing the record of President Reagan's 1981 appointee, Justice
O'Connor, who, although she voted with Justice Rehnquist in 87% of
the cases and was generally more conservative than her predecessor, was
more liberal than he had been on sex discrimination rulings.2' Tribe con-
cluded: "Defying the desire of Court watchers to stuff Justices once and
for all into pigeonholes of 'right' or 'left,' this story, too, is fairly typical:
when one Justice is replaced with another, the impact on the Court is
likely to be progressive on some issues, conservative on others."'
In the November 1986 elections, the Democrats regained control of
the U.S. Senate, re-establishing a Democratic majority that had been
swept away in the 1980 Reagan landslide.23 This change slowed the ap-
pointment of Reagan judges for at least two reasons: first, the nominees
received closer scrutiny; second, the administration exercised more care
15. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
16. Id. at 31.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 31-32.
19. Id. at 35.
20. Id. at 40.
21. Id. at 38-40.
22. Id. at 40.
23. HAYNES JOHNSON, SLEEPWALKING THROUGH HISTORY: AMERICA IN THE REAGAN
YEARS 295-96 (1991).
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in selecting nominees to avoid giving the opposition any more ammuni-
tion for the 1988 election. Professor Tribe's book well may have pro-
vided motivation for the Democratic Senators who resisted President
Reagan's second term judicial nominations, the most memorable of
which was the battle over Robert Bork's nomination in 1987.
This Article is divided into seven major parts. Part I examines the
battles over the nominations that President Reagan sent to the Senate.
Part II provides an analysis of selected 1985 U.S. Courts of Appeals deci-
sions in Title VII cases to determine whether any meaningful relation-
ship existed between the identity of the appointing President and a
judge's voting pattern on employment discrimination cases. Part III
summarizes significant Title VII decisions handed down by the U.S.
Supreme Court between 1981 and 1989. An analysis of the voting pat-
terns of the justices on Title VII cases is presented in Part IV. Support
for enforcement of Title VII is examined in Part V. The most significant
Title VII case in the period, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,2 4 is
examined in detail in Part VI. Finally, Part VII examines the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. In whole, this Article is designed to provide the reader with
a comprehensive overview of the Reagan legacy in the area of federal
fair employment practices.
I. NOMINATIONS AND BATTLE STATIONS
There were 736 federal judges with lifetime appointments actually
sitting in courts of general jurisdiction in the United States at the end of
January 1989. Of those judges, President Reagan had named 346, not
quite half of them. 5 The naming of more than half the federal judiciary
is a feat accomplished by only two presidents in recent history.2 6 Presi-
dent Reagan had installed a relatively painstaking process for screening
24. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
25. Telephone Interview with Professor Sheldon Goldman, University of Massachusetts at
Amherst (Sept. 24, 1992). Professor Goldman cited his article entitled Reagan's Judicial Leg-
acy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JuDicATURE 318, 319 (1989). Professor
Goldman also indicated that as of September 1992, Mr. Reagan's appointees still in active
service numbered only 323, but the percentage of Reagan appointees was down to 39% since
85 judgeships were added in 1990. Id. at 318 n.4. These numbers were not up to the levels
estimated by court observers even as late as 1987. For instance, as of December 31, 1987, one
study showed that only three of some 350 nominees for federal judgeships had been forced to
withdraw; only one nominee named by Reagan had been actually defeated in the U.S. Senate.
With over one year remaining in office, Ronald Reagan would likely name well over 50% of
the sitting federal judges. HELMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE CouRTs: THE CONSERVATIVE
CAMPAIGN TO REwRITE THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1988).
26. Robert Friedman & Stephen Wermiel, Stacked Bench: Reagan Appointments to the
Federal Bench Worry U.S. Liberals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1985, at 1.
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candidates for judicial office.2 7 The process involved the following five
steps:
I. Nomination by U.S. Senators from the state with the va-
cancy (district court);
II. Justice Department background search;
III. Interviews by several Justice Department officials who
probe views about:
a. federal courts' role,
b. death penalty,
c. Roe v. Wade28 (abortion decision),
d. favorite Supreme Court Justice;
IV. Approval of U.S. Attorney General;
V. Review at weekly meeting of high-level White House com-
mittee watched over by Fred Fielding, the White House
counsel.29
Liberals claimed the White House was applying overtly ideological
standards to the selection of judges in an attempt to reshape entire areas
of federal law. Indeed, in the 1980 campaign, Reagan pledged to ap-
point a new generation of conservative judges who would reverse what
he said was a tendency to use the courts for social activism.30 Attorney
General Meese reiterated this strict-constructionist approach in the sum-
mer of 1985.3'
By the start of his second term, President Reagan had appointed
more than 200 (27%) district and appeals court judges and one Supreme
Court Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor. The profile of first-term appoin-
tees showed:
98% Republican,
93% white,
92% male,
90% from non-ivy league law schools,
25% millionaires (approximately),
10% under 40 years of age
(approximately),
5% Jewish (12 appointees).32
27. Id.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Friedman & Wermiel, supra note 26, at 1.
30. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 424.
31. Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Address Before the American Bar Association
(July 17, 1985).
32. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench in
His Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 335, 338-39, 344-45 (1983).
[Vol. 77:645
1994] THE WINDING ROAD TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 651
In the 1984 campaign, Walter Mondale and the Democrats raised the
issue of judicial appointments, focusing particularly on anticipated ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court during the second term.33 However, if
President Reagan's appointees do not all toe the party line, it will not be
the first time. One of the best illustrations at the Supreme Court level is
President Eisenhower's appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice.34
Warren had been a district attorney in California, a law-and-order attor-
ney general, and the Governor of California who supported internment
of the Japanese during World War IJ3 His selection as Chief Justice did
not raise concerns that it would launch a new civil rights era. Yet, before
the end of his second term, Eisenhower said the Warren appointment
was "the biggest damn-fool mistake I ever made. 36
There have been several significant personnel changes on the
Supreme Court since January 1981. None will prove more significant
than the departures of William J. Brennan, Jr., who resigned from the
U.S. Supreme Court on Friday, July 20, 1990 after thirty-four years on
the court,37 and the departure less than one year later of Thurgood Mar-
shall, the first black man to sit on the Supreme Court, after twenty-four
years of service.38 However, the changes before 1989 were vitally signifi-
cant in laying the foundation for the Court's turn to the right. In 1981, a
newly elected President Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor to the
Court upon the retirement of Potter Stewart. 9 In May 1986, Reagan
appointed William Rehnquist, "the most reactionary justice in modern
times,"40 to succeed Chief Justice Warren Burger and Antonin Scalia of
the D.C. Circuit to fill the empty chair.4 ' President Reagan's last ap-
pointment to the high Court involved elevating Anthony Kennedy of the
33. See; e.g., Where Reagan and Mondale Stand on Key Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1984,
at 36.
34. BERNARD SCHWAR-TZ & STEPHEN LESHER, INsmE THE WARREN COURT (1983).
35. Id. at 8-13.
36. Id. at 92.
37. Stephen Wermiel, Legal Watershed, High Court Vacancy is Threat to Abortion, Oppor-
tunity for Bush, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1990, at Al.
38. Thurgood Marshall resigned on Thursday, June 27, 1991. See; eg., Stephen Wermiel,
Hard Right Conservatives Lock Up Control of High Court as Marshall Retires, WALL ST. J.,
June 28, 1991, at Al. For an excellent treatment of Justice Marshall's life, see MICHAEL D.
DAVIs & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE
BENCH (1992).
39. SCHWVARTz, supra note 25, at 63.
40. Id. at 110.
41. Id. at 117-118.
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Ninth Circuit to take the seat vacated by Lewis Powell, a Nixon ap-
pointee, in June 1987.42
Yet, as important as these judicial appointments are to understanding
the Court's turn to the right,4 3 the defeat of three critical Reagan nomi-
nations may be equally significant in determining the outer limits of that
change in direction. In 1985, William Bradford Reynolds was rejected
by the Senate as a nominee for the position of Associate Attorney Gen-
eral. This was a key rejection that presaged the battle the following year
over Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice and the defeats of the nomi-
nations of Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg to the high Court in
1987." These three defeats may have signified the public's unwillingness
to accept an ideologically rigid right-wing Court. Let us now turn to the
Reynolds nomination.
"Those who oppose [William Bradford] Reynolds['s nomination]
favor inflicting injuries on persons who are guilty of no unlawful behav-
ior and who have benefitted from no unlawful behavior, and who are to
be injured solely because of their sex or skin pigmentation."'4 5 So wrote
George Will, one of the most visible of the conservative commentators
with access to the Reagan White House. Will reflected the themes of the
Reagan forces as they girded for battle in 1985 as well as the Republican
Party line, which was announced by the following words in the platform:
"Just as we must guarantee opportunity, we oppose attempts to dictate
results. We will resist efforts to replace equal rights with discriminatory
quota systems and preferential treatment. Quotas are the most insidious
form of discrimination: reverse discrimination against the innocent."' 6
42. Id. at 144, 148-49.
43. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 5; David 0. Stewart, Civil Rights: Just a Trim?, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1989, at 40-45; Gest, supra note 5.
44. SCHwARTZ, supra note 25, at 119-48.
45. George Will, Battling the Racial Spoils System, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1985, at 96.
46. A Free and Just Society, 42 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2107 (1984). The code word "Quo-
tas" appears to have gained almost institutional significance. Andrew Hacker makes such a
point in the following passage:
Apart from some blatant Willie Horton episodes, racial references tend to be conveyed
in nuances and codes, including allusions to crime and comments on quotas. In his
1990 campaign for another Senate term, Jesse Helms of North Carolina confined his
overtures to white voters. "You needed that job, and you were the best qualified," one
of his commercials ran. "But it had to go to a minority because of a racial quota."
White voters from all regions and classes have little trouble intuiting where candidates
like Helms stand.
ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONs: BLACK AND WrrE, SEPARATE, HOSiLE, UNEQuAL 202
(1992).
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On the other side of this debate, we heard plenty of doubts and some
despair about whether the civil rights advances of the 1960s would sur-
vive a second Reagan administration. "We've been living on the gas-
tank fumes of the protest of the 1960's - and the gas-tank is empty.
We've got to do it all over again."47 Those in Congress who opposed the
Reynolds nomination sounded a different battle cry as they prepared to
join the issue with their colleagues across the aisle: "To claim that there
is strict color and gender-blindness in a society that is not color and gen-
der-blind only perpetuates discrimination and circumvents the law."48
In this way, furor over President Reagan's nomination in 1985 of Wil-
1am Bradford Reynolds to the Justice Department's number-three spot
put into focus many of the issues raised during President Reagan's first
term regarding Title VII interpretation and enforcement. The Reynolds
nomination ultimately failed to clear the Senate Judiciary Committee,
and Reynolds retired to his old post as civil rights chief.49
On June 5, 1986, by a narrow 10-8 party-line vote, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee rejected the first judicial nominee since President
Carter's administration.50 But it took a remarkable nomination to gen-
erate that single downturn for President Reagan's campaign to redesign
the federal courts: Jefferson Sessions, the federal prosecutor in Mobile
who called a black aide "boy" and described a white civil-rights lawyer
as a "disgrace to his race.""1 Sessions failed to earn the vote of one of
the Alabama senators, Howell Heflin, in his bid for committee approval.
What amazed some observers was not that the nomination was defeated,
but that it could muster eight votes.52
By July 1985, the frustration with which civil rights activists and polit-
ical liberals viewed the Reagan policies and the prospect of four more
years boiled over. In an unprecedented move, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sued Attorney Gen-
eral Ed Meese in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking an order enjoining the Attorney General and the Department of
47. Federal Tax Bite-State by State, U.S. NEws & WoR.D REP., July 15, 1985, at 14.
48. Don Edwards, Quotes, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1985, at 35.
49. David A. Alpern, A Roadblock for Reynolds, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1985, at 43.
50. Stephen Wermiel, Reagan Nominee for the Federal Bench is Rejected by Senate Judici-
ary Panel, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1986, at 62.
51. Senate Panel Defeats Reagan Choice" "Racist" Label Sinks Court Nominee, U.S. NEws
& WoRUD REP., June 16, 1986, at 8.
52. Wermiel, supra note 50.
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Justice from reopening or consenting to the reopening of any decree in
any action brought by the government under Title VII.53
Essentially, the dispute was over Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 54 which contained language about employment goals and timeta-
bles for minorities and women not proven to be "actual victims" of dis-
crimination.55 The NAACP sought to have the Attorney General and
the Justice Department enjoined based on an Administrative Procedures
Act (APA) provision allowing for judicial review of final federal agency
action for which there is no other adequate judicial remedy.56 On July 2,
1985, Judge Harold H. Greene held that his court lacked authority under
the APA or any executive order to enjoin the Attorney General from
exercising prosecutorial discretion to reopen or consent to reopen any
Title VII decrees.57 The fact that the action was denied is not as remark-
able as the vast distrust manifested by such an unprecedented attempt at
judicial restraint of the executive branch.
Although the NAACP despaired, there were mixed perceptions in
the media as to the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in Title VII cases.
One commentator suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court was activist,
but less activist than the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.58 Certainly,
there was some confusion in the media as to where the line was drawn
between Reagan administration appointees, such as William Bradford
Reynolds and Ed Meese, and the function of the federal judiciary. This
confusion left the impression that the entire federal government was
moving to the right. However, after the 1982 defeat of the Equal Rights
Amendment, feminists and organizations representing them were in-
creasingly dependent upon the judiciary.5 9
The debate over Title VII continued, and in 1986 the nation wit-
nessed the elevations of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and Antonin
53. NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 206 (D.C.D.C. 1985).
54. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
55. Id. at 578-81.
56. Meese, 615 F. Supp. at 206.
57. Id. at 204-06. In part, Judge Greene ruled:
It may well be that plaintiffs are correct in their interpretation of Stotts, but the
Supreme Court's opinion in that case is sufficiently Delphic that a contrary construc-
tion cannot with certainty be ruled out.... This District Court is not the appropriate
forum for a nation-wide determination of the meaning of Stotts by way of an injunction
against the Attorney General.
Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
58. John S. Baker, Activists on the Ninth Circuit Strike Out, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1984, at
28.
59. See generally, Joann S. Lublin, Where Does the Women's Movement Go Now?, WALL
ST. J., June 29, 1982, at 26.
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Scalia from the D.C. Circuit to Associate Justice. The Senate approved
the nominations without much of a fight. As to the former, one observer
believed that the opposition was reluctant to criticize a sitting justice or
open itself to charges that it opposed a nomination on ideological
grounds when the only thing at stake was the difference between Rehn-
quist as Chief and Rehnquist as Associate Justice.60 Nonetheless, Rehn-
quist's nomination as Chief Justice drew the most negative votes in the
history of the position.61 Scalia's nomination to Associate Justice was
unanimously approved primarily because of the opposition's preoccupa-
tion with the simultaneous Rehnquist nomination and the fact that Scalia
was simply replacing the equally conservative Warren Burger.62
In 1987, Ronald Reagan made his most controversial nomination to
the Supreme Court, nominating Robert Bork to fill the vacancy created
by Lewis Powell's resignation.63 William Bradford Reynolds, who had
been given authority to act as Meese's deputy, was running the Justice
Department on a day-to-day basis while Meese dealt with his own
problems, Wedtech and Iran-Contra, on the hill.64 This time, Reynolds
had no tolerance for talk about easy-to-confirni nominees.65 In this set-
ting, President Reagan sent the name of Robert Bork to the Senate for
confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court.
At least two books have been written about the battle in the U.S.
Senate over the Bork nomination.66 One commentator saw the setting
60. ScHwARTiz, supra note 25, at 115.
61. Id. at 117. The vote was 65 to 33, "the largest vote against a chief justice in history."
Id
62. Id. at 118.
63. Wendy Williams, in an essay first published in 1987, succinctly puts into focus the
stakes in the 1987 nomination to replace Lewis Powell:
By the time Warren Burger left the Supreme Court, the major equality issues were
decided: the earlier flood of decisions had diminished to a trickle. The addition of
Antonin Scalia to the Court and the elevation of William Rehnquist to chief justice
weakens, but does not radically change, the Court's commitment to gender equality. If
given the opportunity by the death or retirement of any of the liberal justices, however,
President Reagan will almost certainly transfigure the Court and end its already declin-
ing activism on the issue. In any case, the equality the Court's revolution has brought
has not fundamentally improved the economic status of women.
Wendy W. Williams, Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender Gap, in THm BURGER
YEARs: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986 (Herman Schwartz, ed.,
1987).
64. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 168.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: Tim POLrrICAL SEDUCTION
OF Tim LAW (1990); ETrHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JusncE: How Tim BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989).
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this way: The unexpected retirement of Lewis Powell on June 26 [1987]
and the swift nomination of Bork were thus a staggering one-two punch
to civil rights and other public-interest groups. If Bork were confirmed,
a moderate, humane conservative would be replaced by a rigid, hard ex-
tremist.67Ironically, Robert Bork, not unlike President Reagan who had
begun his adult life as an FDR New Dealer,68 had been a liberal who
passed out leaflets for Adlai Stevenson.69 However, at the University of
Chicago Law School, Bork underwent a conversion experience that
swung him sharply to the right.7" In a famous 1971 article, Bork laid out
his conviction that the only true and neutral sources of constitutional
doctrine are the text, the original intention of the framers, and reason-
able implications from the governmental processes contained in the
text.7' He attacked court decisions promoting individual liberties in the
areas of equality, privacy, and free speech. During the Watergate crisis,
Bork had fired Archibald Cox after Elliot Richardson and William
Ruckleshaus resigned rather than follow President Nixon's directive to
remove the special prosecutor.72 Seven years later, Bork published a
book in which he called on the courts to "overturn most current antitrust
law, and to loosen the restrictions on business to permit almost all merg-
ers and restraints on distribution. 73
Howard Baker, White House chief of staff, and Washington lawyer
Lloyd Cutler, a Democrat, "did not think the Democrat-controlled Sen-
ate would confirm such an idealogue." 74 Therefore, they spent much
time and money trying to repackage Bork as a "moderate conservative"
- in the tradition of Harlan, Brandeis, and Frankfurter.75 Millions of
dollars were spent trying to pressure the Senate into confirming Bork
$2.5 million was budgeted for one advertising campaign alone.76 The
strategy backfired as conservatives in the Republican fold were angered
that they were being asked to fight for the nomination of a "moderate"
67. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 122.
68. GAi. SHEEHY, CHARACrER: AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR LEADERSHIP 242-45 (1990);
GARRY WILs, REAGAN'S AMEruCA: INNocENTs AT HoME 58-63, 244-45 (1987).
69. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 126.
70. Id.
71. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ.
1 (1971).
72. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 24 (1987).
73. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 129 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE AITrrRtusT PARA-
DOx 409-13 n.16 (1978)).
74. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 125.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 131.
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to the Court; at Justice, Meese and Reynolds were also agitating for a
hard sell and a direct ideological confrontation. 77
For their part, Bork's opponents began organizing as soon as the
nomination was announced. 78 A Bork nomination had been a possibility
in 1986, and some analyses of his record had been made by a group
called "Supreme Court Watch. '79 Ultimately, over 300 groups came out
against the Bork nomination. "Key roles were played by Planned
Parenthood, Common Cause, and the American Civil Liberties
Union.", 0
Significant opposition to the nomination existed among Robert
Bork's former colleagues in higher education and the bar. Over forty
percent of the faculty at accredited law schools signed letters opposing
his nomination.8 1 Five of the fifteen members of the American Bar As-
sociation's Committee on the Federal Judiciary refused to give Bork a
"qualified rating" - a first for a Supreme Court nominee since the ABA
began evaluating candidates. s2 Two factors go a long way toward ex-
plaining the defeat of the nomination. First, there was little popular sup-
port anywhere in the country. Second, the gamble Bork took in giving
thirty hours of detailed testimony over five days failed to persuade many
listeners - unlike the earlier dramatic testimony of Marine Lt. Col. Oli-
ver North that won over some opponents. Ultimately, on October 6,
1987, the Senate Judiciary Committee chaired by Joseph Biden voted 9-5
against him.83
Robert Bork refused to withdraw, and his nomination went to the
Senate floor. The final vote, on October 23, 1987, was 58-42, the largest
margin of defeat ever for a Supreme Court nominee.84 On the bicenten-
nial of the Constitution, as one observer noted, Americans held a plebi-
scite on what they wanted from the Court that enforces and interprets
the document. The vast majority approved the directions the Court had
taken - especially in the areas of equality, privacy, and free speech.
Despite the efforts of a very popular President to tilt the Court hard
77. Id.
78. Id. at 132.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 132-33.
82. Id. at 133.
83. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 146.
84. Id
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right, the public did not support the addition of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court.85
The Ginsburg Fiasco
Decision day for the Reagan White House on the next nominee fell
six days after the defeat of the Bork nomination. Howard Baker wanted
Anthony Kennedy, a Ninth Circuit judge from Reagan's Sacramento
days. Ed Meese pushed for Douglas Ginsburg, a forty-one year old D.C.
Court of Appeals judge and former Harvard Law School faculty mem-
ber. Fifteen possible nominees had been pared down to Kennedy and
Ginsburg; ultimately, President Reagan seemed swayed by Ginsburg's
youth, as he was ten years younger than Judge Kennedy.86 The thought
of Ginsburg sitting on the high Court for forty years appealed to the
President, along with his desire to stick the Senate with a candidate it
would like no better than Robert Bork.8 7
The nomination of Ginsburg, which was officially announced on Oc-
tober 29th,88 started to unravel quickly. Nina Totenberg of National
Public Radio and Al Kamen of the Washington Post spent several days
talking with Ginsburg's friends on the Harvard Law faculty as a step
toward developing a profile on the little known nominee. They turned
up information that in the 1970s Ginsburg had smoked marijuana with
friends.89 This might not have been very significant in other settings, but
for the Reagan administration, which had raised intolerance of drug use
to a public virtue, it proved disabling. Jokes about the "high court" satu-
rated talk shows and dinner conversations. By Friday night, November
6th, even William Bradford Reynolds had had enough. That night, both
Reynolds and William J. Bennett, Reagan's Secretary of Education,
called Ginsburg to urge him to withdraw. On Saturday, nine days after
the nomination was announced, Ginsburg withdrew.9"
The same morning, Attorney General Ed Meese had an Air Force
plane waiting at McClellan Air Base to fly Anthony Kennedy back to
Washington, D.C. where he was installed at the Army-Navy Club near
the White House and grilled on his personal background. By Monday
85. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 140.
86. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 178. In addition to age, Ginsburg's ideological rigidness and
his Jewishness were pluses in the decision. Patrick Buchanan "happily dubbed him 'son of
Bork.'" SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 144-45.
87. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 144.
88. Id. at 145.
89. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 179.
90. Id. at 179-80; SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 145-47.
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night, White House aides and the F.B.I. had turned out a completely
clean bill of health for Kennedy, with the sole exception that his daugh-
ter had an unpaid parking ticket.91 The nomination was announced on
Wednesday, November 11th, passed the relieved Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee without any problems or probing questions, and was unanimously
confirmed by the Senate on February 3, 1988.92 Curiously, the Senate
Judiciary Committee reported that Kennedy, a dependable conservative,
might have judicial qualities similar to those of Lewis Powell.93 Some
questions persisted as to where Justice Anthony M. Kennedy might
come down on certain issues; but few observers doubted that the new
Justice, although not a rigid ideologue in the image of Robert Bork, rep-
resented a solid fifth vote for the Rehnquist Court.94 President Reagan's
molding of the Court had been completed.
I. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
Evaluating the impact of President Reagan's appointments to the
Courts of Appeals on Title VII interpretation and enforcement
presented some difficulties. Every Justice votes (and sometimes writes)
on almost every Supreme Court case. But on the twenty-eight member
Ninth Circuit, for example, virtually all the Title VII cases are decided by
three-judge panels that are randomly constituted. Additionally, there
are eight senior circuit judges who may also sit on panels and a list of
federal district judges in the area served by the Ninth Circuit who may
sit when designated by the court administrator.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, this section examines selected de-
cisions from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
D.C. Circuit was selected because of its historic prominence and be-
cause, at the time of analysis, its members were split fairly evenly be-
tween Republican and Democratic nominees. The Seventh Circuit was
selected because it is the only circuit on which a majority of the acting
circuit judges had been appointed by President Reagan. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has been selected because it is dominated by President Carter's ap-
pointments and had received some publicity due to its reversal rate by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the period studied.95
91. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 180-81.
92. SCHwARTz, supra note 25, at 148-49.
93. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 182.
94. Id
95. Baker, supra note 58, at 28.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
I chose for my sample the Title VII cases listed by a Lexis search as
decided by the three circuits from January 1, 1985 through July 23, 1985.
The search produced eleven cases in the D.C. Circuit, nineteen cases in
the Seventh Circuit, and eighteen cases in the Ninth Circuit. These sam-
ples were from total populations of 105 cases, 100 cases, and 153 cases
respectively. The last six months of the October 1984 Supreme Court
Term were selected because they reflect the maximum influence of the
Reagan appointees in the first term.
The first step duplicated the evaluation process used for the U.S.
Supreme Court and is subject to the same objections. The grids or matri-
ces produced are shown in Table I. Because of the screening out of age
discrimination, handicapped, and Reconstruction Era statute cases, the
number of cases in each sample has dropped.
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE TITLE VII
CASES FOR COURTS OF APPEALS
Affirm Expand Restrict
D.C. CIRCUIT Status Quo Title VII Title VII
Procedural 4 1 0
Substantive 0 3 1
9 Cases Total 4 4 1
7TH CIRCUIT
Procedural 5 0 2
Substantive 2 3 0
12 Cases Total 7 3 2
9TH CIRCUIT
Procedural 7 0 0
Substantive 3 3 0
13 Cases Total 10 3 0
A visual analysis of this data did not produce much useful informa-
tion on the impact of Reagan appointees. A chi-square analysis re-
arranging the data into another formation and applying a null hypothesis
that voting behavior on Title VII cases is independent of appointing
power politics was conducted.
I arranged the votes on all Title VII cases in the sample in a 2x3 grid
(Table II) separating out the votes of Reagan's appointees from appoin-
tees of other presidents. Since the Reagan votes in the Ninth Circuit
were so small, I also broke out the votes of President Carter's appointees
who numerically dominated the Ninth Circuit. The observed levels of
voting behavior do not differ significantly (at the .05 level) from the ex-
pected frequencies, and we cannot statistically eliminate the Ho (null
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TABLE II
DIsTRBTM ON OF VOTES ON SAMPLE TITLE VII CASES
BY CIRcurr wrrH CI-SQUAR.E VALUES SHOWN
Affirm Expand Restrict
D.C. CmcuIT Status Quo Title VII Title VII
Reagan Appointees 6 2 0
Other 9 14 3
34 Votes 15 16 3
7TH Cmcurr
Reagan Appointees
Other
35 Votes
9TH CiRcurr
Reagan Appointees
Other
39 Votes
9 CIRcutrr
Carter Appointees
Other
39 Votes
xl
xl
xi
xi
= 4.26
= 2.03
= 0.307
= 0.417
17 4
13 5
30 9
(D.C. Circuit)
(7th Circuit)
(9th Circuit / Reagan)
(9th Circuit / Carter)
hypothesis). The critical value of x2 at .05 level with two degrees of free-
dom is 5.99147.
These results should be viewed with some caution due to (1) the sub-
jective nature of the classification; (2) the limited size of the sample; and
(3) the low expected values involved. (One rule on sample size is that,
ideally, less than 20% of matrix squares should involve values less than
5.0.) In other words, the results of a study of Courts of Appeals deci-
sions over a six-month period at the end of the October 1984 Term show
that these judges do not rigidly adhere to the political position of their
appointing presidents on matters of employment discrimination. These
results are supportive of Professor Tribe's observation that President
Reagan's screening process for judicial nominees, as extensive as it was,
could not guarantee results for more than a handful of issues and then
not consistently once a judge received lifetime tenure.9 6
96. TRBE, supra note 15, at 50-70.
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III. U.S. SUPREMEv COURT DECISIONS
This section reviews all Title VII decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
from the October 1980 Term until the end of the October 1988 Term.
Decisions are evaluated and then classified as either: (a) upholding the
status quo; (b) restricting application of Title VII; or (c) expanding the
application of Title VII. This classification is then used in the next sec-
tion to help analyze judicial voting patterns. Two reasons can be ad-
vanced for those cutoff dates: (1) even though President Reagan was a
"lame duck" by the start of the October 1988 Term, shortly after it
started, his vice president, George Bush, was elected President and the
national agenda hardly shifted at all; (2) even though President Reagan
was not elected until one month after the October 1980 Term began and
did not take office until the following January, his November election
signaled a shift in the national agenda and political environment that
most likely influenced Court deliberations during most of the October
1980 Term.
A. October 1980 Term
In County of Washington v. Gunther,97 a five-member majority of the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that the Bennett amend-
ment to Title VII98 did not restrict Title VII's prohibition of sex-based
wage discrimination to claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Rather,
the Court held that a claim for sex-based wage discrimination could also
be brought independently under Title VII.99 This result marked a signif-
icant expansion of Title VII jurisdiction to deal with a wide range of
wage discrimination issues that are not covered under the 1963 Act. Jus-
tice Rehnquist filed a vigorous dissenting opinion in which the Chief Jus-
tice and Justices Potter Stewart and Lewis Powell joined.10
Earlier in the term, a denial of certiorari provoked dissents from the
Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist in Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing
Co. v. Fisher.' Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should have
granted certiorari because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
encroached on the rule established in International Brotherhood of
97. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h)(1976)).
99. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168.
100. Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. 449 U.S. 1115 (1981).
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Teamsters v. United States,"02 which held that an otherwise bona fide sen-
iority system did not lose its protected status under Title VII simply be-
cause its operation serves to perpetuate pre-act discrimination. °3
Specifically, Rehnquist argued that the Fifth Circuit's use of statistical
evidence to uphold the district court's invalidation of the challenged sen-
iority system was flawed because it failed to consider the effect of the
bona fide seniority system in perpetuating pre-act discrimination against
black employees in awarding management jobs. °4 In making this argu-
ment, Justice Rehnquist noted that as of January 1, 1977, there were 239
white employees at the plant with more seniority than the most senior
black employee.'0 5 Because I found this argument unpersuasive, this de-
cision was grouped with the status quo decisions.
Previously, in a 5-4 decision, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Pow-
ell, had reversed a Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on when the
applicable statute of limitations began running in a denial of tenure
case.106 Delaware State College v. Ricks,'10 7 which was announced on De-
cember 15, 1980, was the first Title VII case handed down by the Court
after Ronald Reagan's election to the White House. The district court
had ruled that the statute of limitations began to run when the faculty
member, Columbus Ricks, a black Liberian, was notified that he would
be receiving a terminal contract for the 1974-75 school year and granted
a motion to dismiss.' ° As a matter of policy, the Third Circuit had held
that the "final date of employment" rule prevailed and that the notice of
terminal contract was subject to reversal by its own terms.10 9 Using a
clearly erroneous standard, the majority of the Court upheld the district
court determination and reversed the Third Circuit.110 Justice Potter
Stewart dissented in an opinion in which Brennan and Marshall
joined,' and Justice Stevens dissented separately.1' 2 Stewart argued
that a question of fact existed as to when Ricks had been denied tenure;
therefore, a motion to dismiss was wrongly granted. 113 Stevens argued
102. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
103. Id. at 348-55.
104. Fisher, 449 U.S. at 1116 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105." Id. at 1117.
106. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
107. Id.
108. Id at 254-55.
109. Id. at 255-56.
110. Id. at 262.
111. Id. at 262 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 265 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
113. Id. at 265 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that the actual last date of employment was most appropriate since
before then the wrong was subject to change and because it was the date
subject to the least dispute.'1 4
Because I was persuaded that the majority had narrowed the window
for Title VII claims in academic settings as a matter of law in an area
where prior decisions were more liberal, this decision was included with
the group that procedurally restricted Title VII. Note that in this pre-
Justice O'Connor decision, Eisenhower appointee Potter Stewart voted
with the liberal wing of the Court and Justice White's decision to go
along with the Rehnquist group threw the outcome into the restrictive
category. Thus, White's was the swing vote on a Title VII issue, a pat-
tern that prevailed for the entire first term of the Reagan administration.
In EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.,"5 the Court held that
Congress did not intend to preclude charging parties from obtaining ac-
cess to information that the EEOC acquired under its investigative pow-
ers before institution of formal proceedings.1 1 6 In this case, the
employer refused to provide the EEOC with the complainant's employ-
ment records and other information relating to its employment practices
unless the EEOC agreed not to disclose it to the charging parties. The
EEOC refused and issued its subpoena." 7 The district court refused to
enforce the subpoena without a condition of nondisclosure, and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed." 8 The Supreme Court reversed and held that a
charging employee was entitled to see information in his or her own file,
but was a member of the public to whom disclosure was barred as to any
other employment ffle." 9 Justice Blackmun concurred in part and dis-
sented in part arguing for a different standard; 20 Justice Stevens dis-
sented.' 2 ' Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist took no part in the
case.122 I was persuaded by the dissents and therefore listed this case as
one that expanded the procedural interpretation of Title VII to include
limited prelitigation discovery, a matter not previously free of doubt.
Two unanimous decisions in the same term served to affirm the status
quo. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,23 the Court
114. Id. at 265 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. 449 U.S. 590 (1981).
116. Id. at 598-600.
117. Id. at 594.
118. l1& at 594-95.
119. Id. at 604.
120. Id at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
121. Id- at 606 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 604.
123. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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vacated and remanded a Fifth Circuit decision124 on the defendant's bur-
den of proof in a Title VII gender discrimination action following the
complainant's establishing a prima facie case. 25 The 9-0 decision, in an
opinion by Justice Powell, held that the defendant only had the burden
of clearly explaining the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions1 26 as
the Court had previously ruled in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.27
In Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,"2 a united Court held that denial of
a joint motion of the parties to enter a consent decree containing injunc-
tive relief in a Title VII class action was an appealable order under the
standards announced in Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger.12 9
The last Title VII case to be considered this term was U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens.'30 The decision to summarily va-
cate the judgment provoked a dissent by Justice Marshall arguing that
the remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the plaintiff's
burden of proof in a Title VII case, in light of the decision in Burdine,'3'
was both unnecessary and confusing.' 32 At this stage of the proceeding,
a remand did not strike me as doing anything beyond upholding the evi-
dentiary standards expressed in prior cases. Thus, this case shows up in
the status quo column.
B. October 1981 Term
In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,'3 3 a five-member majority
of the Court held that prior proceedings under the New York State Divi-
sion of Human Rights provided collateral estoppel for a subsequent
EEOC action under Title VII.' Justice Stevens dissented separately. 35
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall. 36 The decision involved some complex
questions of res judicata; however, the conclusion seems unavoidable
124. Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979).
125. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 274.
126. Id. at 252-60.
127. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
128. 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
129. 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
130. 453 U.S. 902 (1981).
131. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
132. Aikens, 453 U.S. at 906 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
134. Id. at 468-69.
135. Id. at 508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that it substantially restricted the jurisdiction of the EEOC and thus the
reach of Title VII legislation.
In the same term and with the same 5-4 split, the Court in American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson3 7 held that the § 703(h) protection for bona
fide seniority systems was not limited to seniority systems adopted
before the effective date of Title VII (July 2, 1965), but rather operated
to provide some protection to seniority systems adopted after the effec-
tive date of the Act.' The concern of the dissent was that the seniority
system adopted by American Tobacco fell hard on the heels of a long
history of segregation and discrimination by race on the part of the em-
ployer.139 The minority sought to have the more rigorous standards of
Title VII race discrimination applied to the seniority system absent the
§ 703(h) exemption.' Thus, the Court held that the post-Title VII sen-
iority system of American Tobacco did not violate Title VII.141
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,42 a unanimous Court
held that a New York corporation that was a wholly owned subsidiary of
a Japanese general trading company was subject to Title VII require-
ments in its employment, notwithstanding language in the friendship,
commerce, and navigation treaty between the U.S. and Japan that ex-
empted companies of either nation from employment restrictions in the
hiring of specialists and professional employees of its choice. The Court
reasoned that a New York corporation was not a corporation of Japan
for purposes of the treaty exemption. 43 Although this case presented a
narrow issue, it may become significantly more important in future years
and does represent an expansion of the Title VII jurisdiction. My reser-
vations about including it with the cases that substantively expand Title
VII were based on the narrow impact of the ruling and not its substance.
In Connecticut v. Teal, 44 a five-member majority rejected the "bot-
tom-line" defense of the State of Connecticut, which argued that an em-
ployment decision result more favorable to blacks than whites was a
sufficient defense to a disparate impact charge based upon a pass-fail
examination for supervisor. 45 The majority pointed out that § 703
137. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
138. I. at 77.
139. Id at 78-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. IA at 80-84.
141. I& at 76-77.
142. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
143. Id. at 189.
144. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
145. Id- at 451.
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(a)(2) of Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to "limit, segregate or classify his employees" in any way which
would deprive "any individual of employment opportunities" because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 46 Consequently, the major-
ity held that any stage of the promotion or employment process that was
discriminatory subjects the employer to potential Title VII liability even
though the final result may not be statistically discriminatory. 147 The
Teal decision produced a favorable and expansive reading of Title VII
nondiscrimination language.
The following week, in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,148 a six-member
majority of the Court held that an employer charged with Title VII dis-
crimination could toll the accrual of back-pay liability by unconditionally
offering the claimant a job previously denied, even though the employer
did not offer retroactive seniority to the date of the alleged discrimina-
tion.' 49 This rather unusual holding provoked a vigorous dissent from
Justice Blackmun, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 50
Although there was some disagreement about the facts of the case, Jus-
tice Blackmun's dissent was persuasive. It characterized the court's deci-
sion as "unnecessary and unfair"; 51 consequently, I characterized this
decision as restrictive of Title VII.
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.152 involved a Title VII class action
brought initially by the flight attendant's union to challenge TWA's pol-
icy of grounding all female flight attendants who became mothers while
allowing employee fathers to continue to fly. Individual members of the
class were substituted for the union which was held an inadequate repre-
sentative. 53 Issues of whether filing a timely charge with the EEOC was
a jurisdictional prerequisite that could not be waived and whether a ret-
roactive grant of seniority exceeded the Court's authority to remedy Ti-
tle VII violations were examined. 54 Justice White wrote for the
majority holding that filing of a charge with the EEOC was a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite that could be waived or estopped and that a retroac-
tive grant of seniority could be made over the objection of the current
146. Id. at 453.
147. Id. at 454.
148. 458 U.S. 219 (1983).
149. Id. at 232.
150. Id at 241 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
151. Id at 242.
152. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
153. Id. at 385.
154. Id at 392, 398.
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union, rather than the prior union that had brought the action and had
been decertified. 155 In a separate opinion in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist joined, Justice Powell concurred in part and con-
curred in the judgment. 5 6 Based on the retroactive grant of seniority in
a situation where a bona fide seniority system was in place, this decision
represented an expansion of Title VII.
Three Title VII actions from this term fell into the status quo column.
One involved denial of certiorari over multiple dissents. 157  A second
decision, Pullman-Standard v. Swint,15 1 reversed and remanded a Fifth
Circuit decision addressing discrimination under a seniority system chal-
lenged under Title VII. Much of the decision involved the proper divi-
sion of labor between appellate and trial courts, and the Title VII part
instructed the courts on remand to apply existing rules of law.159 Finally,
a third decision, Consolidated Food Corp. v. Unger,60 represented a
unanimous decision to summarily reverse the Seventh Circuit and allow
it to reconsider a conflict between the federal court and the Illinois
courts on an issue of gender-based discrimination 161 in light of the
Court's ruling in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.62
C. October 1982 Term
In a 7-2 decision on June 20, 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, amending Title VII, prohibited
an employer from providing fewer hospitalization benefits for preg-
nancy-related conditions for the wives of male employees than it pro-
vided for its female employees. The decision was Newport News Ship
Building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.163 The majority opinion by Justice
Stevens provoked a dissent from Justice Rehnquist in which Justice Pow-
ell joined."6 Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court was not interpret-
155. Id. at 397, 399.
156. Id at 401.
157. Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 454 U.S. 1060 (1981). Justice White, with
whom Brennan and Marshall joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari. The case in-
volved the issue of whether a plaintiff could have her award reduced for the time between the
date that she could have requested a "right-to-sue" letter and the date she actually made the
request. In White's opinion, a conflict existed between the Circuits on this issue. Id& at 1061-
62 (White, J., dissenting).
158. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
159. Id. at 286.
160. 456 U.S. 1002 (1982).
161. Id& at 1003.
162. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
163. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
164. Id at 685 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ing the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978, but rather expanding it on its
belief that no language in the statute required the protection of spouses
of employees from pregnancy discrimination.165 Interestingly, Justice
Rehnquist was the author of the General Electric Co. v. Gilbert166 deci-
sion, which had provoked Congress into passing the 1978 legislation.
Some hostilities never seem to end.
On July 6, 1983, the Court expanded the operation of Title VII in the
area of retirement benefits in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.67
The Court held that a state's retirement plan that paid female employees
lower monthly retirement benefits than males making the same contri-
butions violated Title VII's proscription against sex-based discrimina-
tion. 16 8 The Court split 5-4 on the issue of retroactivity, with the
majority deciding that the Norris decision should be prospective only. 69
There are two main opinions in this case. The first by Justice Marshall
was joined by Justice O'Connor to produce a majority on the discrimina-
tion issue;170 the second by Justice Powell was joined by Justice
O'Connor to produce the prospective application result.' 71 Viewed in
hindsight, this case presaged the coming of a new order in voting pat-
terns on Title VII issues. I viewed the result as an expansive reading of
the requirements of Title VII.
In Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker,72 Justice Blackmun, for a
unanimous Court, ruled that the filing of a class action tolled the statute
of limitations for respondent and other members of the putative class.'7 3
Therefore, the Court held that since respondent Parker, a black male
who had been discharged by the petitioner, did not receive his notice of
right to sue until after the class action was filed, he had the full ninety
days in which to bring suit after the class action was denied.174 The dis-
trict court had granted summary judgment for the former employer on
the grounds that Parker had not filed his individual lawsuit until almost
two years after receiving his right-to-sue letter. 75 Justice Powell wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
165. Id- at 686-89.
166. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
167. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
168. Id. at 1086.
169. Id. at 1092.
170. Id. at 1075-95.
171. Id. at 1095-1107 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
172. 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
173. Id. at 348-51.
174. Id. at 348.
175. Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 514 F. Supp. 122, 124-26 (D. Md. 1981).
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joined urging restraint in applying the result.17 6 Because this decision
resolved a split in the circuits in favor of the more generous time-line
interpretation, I listed it among the expansive cases.
Two cases in the October 1982 Term maintained the status quo. W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759177 involved some complicated issues of
arbitration of grievances under a collective bargaining agreement that
conflicted with a Title VII consent decree. The arbitrator's award of
damages to a discharged employee was found enforceable, and no public
policy was violated by the imposition of liability under the collective bar-
gaining agreement because the company could not properly shift the
burden of its employment discrimination to the male union members.178
In U.S. Postal System Board of Governors v. Aikens,179 a unanimous
Court vacated and remanded a case in which the D.C. Court of Appeals
had reversed a trial court's decision entering judgment for the Postal
Service.' 80 The case was in the D.C. Circuit for the second time follow-
ing remand from the high Court to reconsider its first reversal based on
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.'81 In short, after
the Postal Service put on its evidence in rebuttal to the nonpromoted
plaintiff, the district court "must decide which party's explanation of the
employer's motivation it believes."'1  This decision seems to merely re-
iterate what the Court wanted the trier of fact to do initially, which was
to apply existing case law.
D. October 1983 Term
The first Title VII case this term involved a denial of certiorari from
which Justices Rehnquist and Brennan dissented in an extremely unu-
sual pairing; the decision was Ashley v. City of Jackson.18 3 The case con-
sidered whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented suit by
white policemen alleging Title VII discrimination on the part of the city
for hiring or promoting less qualified blacks solely on the basis of their
race pursuant to consent decrees entered under prior litigation."8 These
176. Parker, 462 U.S. at 354-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
177. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
178. Id at 770.
179. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
180. Aikens v. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 665 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
181. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
182. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
183. 464 U.S. 900 (1983).
184. Id. at 900-01.
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dissents presage a 5-4 split in Martin v. Wilks, 185 wherein Justice Rehn-
quist mustered the votes to enlarge the possibility of expanded collateral
attacks on prior consent decrees by nonparties.186 At this point, this case
preserved the status quo.
Lehman v. Trout,'87 a memorandum opinion announced on February
27, 1984, directed the D.C. Court of Appeals to remand a Title VII case
which had been pending since 1973 for new findings of fact in light of
Pullman'88 and Aikens.189 Justice Stevens, joined by Brennan and Mar-
shall, dissented from this action involving four female Navy employees
who alleged discrimination in hiring and promotion on the part of the
U.S. Navy.190 The gist of the dissent was that the lower courts had ade-
quately considered the points on which the high Court was basing re-
mand and that protracted litigation needed to be concluded, not
"casually" commanded to begin anew.191 On balance, the Title VII as-
pect of this action seemed to reinforce the status quo.
Procedural application of Title VII was expanded by a 5-4 split in
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co."9 The majority opinion, written by Justice Mar-
shall, held that notice and charge of pattern and practice discrimination
levied by EEOC met statutory requirements of specificity because it
identified blacks and women as victims of employer's putative discrimi-
natory practices; specified six occupational categories to which blacks
had been denied equal access and seven categories to which women had
been denied equal access; and alleged that the employer engaged in dis-
crimination in recruitment, hiring, selection, job assignment, training,
testing, promotion, and terms and conditions of employment. 93 Justice
O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part in an opinion joined
by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Primarily,
the dissent concerned whether the notice of the subpoena to Shell satis-
fied the statute and whether, if it was inadequate, such inadequacy of
notice would require quashing the EEOC's subpoena.' 94 Based on the
dissent, I categorized this case as expanding enforcement of Title VII
procedurally.
185. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 296-301.
186. Id. at 768-69.
187. 465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
188. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
189. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
190. Trout, 465 U.S. at 1056-62 (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
191. IaE at 1060-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. 466 U.S. 54 (1984).
193. Id. at 57-61.
194. Id. at 82-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
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On June 4, 1984, the Court announced its decision in Baldwin County
Welcome Center v. Brown.195 It seems at first reading that the case, in so
far as the majority is concerned, represents an affirmation of the status
quo by strict interpretation of the ninety-day statute of limitations for
filing suit under a right-to-sue letter issued by the EEOC.196 However, a
reading of Justice Stevens's dissent suggests that more was at stake. The
dissent implied that the decision actually narrowed the ninety-day filing
requirement for indigents attempting to obtain appointment of counsel
by the court and filing in forma pauperis.197 Apparently, plaintiff Brown
had sent a letter detailing the basis for her complaint, an affidavit of
indigency, and a request for an appointment of attorney to the court, to
which she had attached her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. She sent
that letter to the court in Montgomery as she was advised to do by the
EEOC. When the matter was transferred to another court, the appoint-
ment of an attorney and the filing of a formal complaint did not occur
until the ninety-sixth day after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter.'98
The majority opinion ignored the handwritten letter of Ms. Brown and
treated the filing of the complaint, which was entitled "Amended Com-
plaint," as though it was the original filing.199 On these facts, the major-
ity is doing nothing original; under the facts produced in the opinion by
Justice Stevens, we have a substantial restriction of access to Title VII
relief for indigent plaintiffs. I resolved this conflict by treating this case
as involving affirmation of the status quo on the ninety-day issue and
also procedurally restricting access to the courts for persons filing in
forma pauperis.
Hishon v. King & Spalding200 was a unanimous ruling of the Court
that Title VII consideration should apply to partnership status where
employment by a partnership is involved.2 ' It represents an expansion
of Title VII into an area thought by many to be immune from the reach
of Title VII on the grounds of freedom of association and that the move-
ment from employee to partner represents a transition from employee to
employer. Those arguments, although considered by the Court, were
dismissed.2"2
195. 466 U.S. 147 (1984).
196. Id at 152.
197. Id at 154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id at 148.
200. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
201. Id. at 75-76.
202. Id at 77-78.
[Vol. 77:645
1994] THE WINDING ROAD TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 673
An important 1984 case, if importance can be judged from media
attention, was Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts." 3 This case
involved a dispute over the implementation of layoffs among Memphis
Fire Department personnel following a consent decree that mandated
certain minimum quotas for black hiring.201 The district court modified
the consent decrees, which originally did not address the question of lay-
offs, and enjoined layoffs by seniority and demotions of minority firemen
so as to maintain current percentages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. °5
The U.S Supreme Court held that a district court order could not be
justified as a proper modification of the consent decree; layoffs by sen-
iority were appropriate, notwithstanding the affirmative action program
that had been mandated for the Memphis Fire Department.20 6 Justice
O'Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring with the majority opin-
ion by Justice White;20 7 Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the
result that characterized the White opinion on Title VII issues as "wholly
advisory."20" Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, dissented.0 9 The Stotts decision, in so far as it upheld seniority
against an affirmative action challenge in time of layoffs, reaffirmed a
line of cases going back to Teamsters v. United States. °10 However, the
tone, as well as some of the language of the White opinion, which gave
some comfort to the parties alleging that affirmative action was reverse
discrimination, were sufficient to qualify that case as restrictive of Title
VII. This is particularly true in view of the strong interpretation of the
case given by Attorney General Ed Meese and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral William Bradford Reynolds and the encouragement that the Reagan
Justice Department took from White's language. This case, then, mer-
ited two marks in Table V.
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,2 11 announced on June
25, 1984, involved procedural issues related to Title VII. For a unani-
mous Court, Justice Stevens held that the judgment in a class action es-
tablishing that an employer did not engage in a general pattern and
practice of discrimination against a certified class of employees did not
preclude individual class members from maintaining subsequent civil ac-
203. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
204. Id at 564-65.
205. Id at 566-68.
206. Id at 573.
207. Id at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. Id at 590 (Stevens, J., concurring).
209. Id at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
211. 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
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tions for racial discrimination against their employer.212 Justice Powell
did not participate and Justice Marshall concurred in the result.2 13 I saw
this decision as establishing a procedural expansion for Title VII
enforcement.
E. October 1985 Term
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education2"4 came down on May 19,
1986. Nonminority teachers sued the Jackson Board of Education alleg-
ing that application of a provision in their collective bargaining agree-
ment that insulated some minority teachers against layoffs by seniority
violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights.21 5 The
challenged provision was adopted by the Jackson Board of Education in
1972 because of racial tension in the community.21 6 After litigation in
both federal and state courts, the Board had adhered to the challenged
provision and, as a direct result, in the 1976-77 and 1981-82 school years
nonminority teachers had been laid off, while minority teachers with less
seniority were retained to maintain racial balance.21 7
The displaced nonminority teachers brought suit in federal district
court alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and other statutes.218 On cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court dismissed all of the teachers' claims.21 9 A
three-judge panel of the court of appeals, relying on the district court's
opinion, affirmed.220 In summary, these courts held that racial prefer-
ences granted by the board need not be grounded in a finding of prior
discrimination, but such preferences were permissible under the Equal
Protection Clause if they were an attempt to remedy societal discrimina-
tion by providing proper role models for minority children. 21
In a cluster of opinions, a bare majority of the Supreme Court re-
versed. Four Justices argued that the Equal Protection Clause precluded
preferential protection from layoff by seniority based on race in the ab-
sence of any determination of prior illegal discrimination.' Exactly
212. I. at 878.
213. Id at 882 (Marshall, J., concurring).
214. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
215. Id. at 271.
216. Id. at 270.
217. Id. at 271-72.
218. Id at 272.
219. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1200-04 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
220. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., Jackson, Mich., 746 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1984).
221. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
222. Id. at 284.
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what the Court held may be subject to some debate as Justice Powell
wrote a mere plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist concurred. Justice O'Connor concurred in part of Powell's
opinion and the judgment, but not in the wording of the appropriate
test.223 Justice White concurred in the judgment, raising issues about
racially discriminatory layoffs in the absence of identified dis-
criminatees 24 Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined.225 Marshall saw the pos-
ture of the case and the issue presented very differently from Powell:
The sole question posed by this case is whether the Constitution
prohibits a union and a local school board from developing a col-
lective-bargaining agreement that apportions layoffs between two
racially determined groups as a means of preserving the effects of
an affirmative hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is
unchallenged2
Justice Stevens dissented separately in an opinion that argued for a di-
rect determination of whether the board's action advances the public in-
terest in educating children for the future, and whether that public
interest justifies the adverse affects imposed upon a disadvantaged
group. 7
I encountered serious doubts about evaluating the case. On one
hand, it seemed to uphold a long line of cases holding that layoffs by
reverse seniority did not violate Title VII. On the other hand, it seemed
to impose a new Equal Protection limitation on the ability of parties to a
collective bargaining agreement to protect an affirmative action plan
(potentially required by Title VII) against dismantling in periods of de-
clining employment. I ultimately decided that Wygant represented a sig-
nificant restriction on Title VII interpretation and enforcement, even
though the decision could have been dismissed as not dealing directly
with Title VII issues. The savaging of progress toward full representa-
tion of women and minorities in the workforce by layoffs during down-
turns has been well documented;2 the distinction between making
hiring progress and protecting such progress seems too artificial to sup-
port radically different approaches by the Court.
223. Id. at 284-94 (O'Connor, i., concurring).
224. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 295-312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 300 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. William A. Wines, Seniority, Recession, and Affirmative Action: The Challenge for
Collective Bargaining, 20 AM. Bus. LJ. 37 (1982).
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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson" 9 was announced exactly one month
after Wygant. A woman employee brought a Title VII action against her
supervisor and her employer, a bank. The district court entered judg-
ment after an eleven-day bench trial for both defendants. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded- 30 A unanimous Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, sustained the reversal and held that the
correct inquiry on issues of sexual harassment was whether sexual ad-
vances were unwelcome, not whether an employee's participation in
them was voluntary.231 Further, the Court held that a sexual harassment
claim could lie even in the absence of any economic impact on the plain-
tiff. The existence of a policy against sexual harassment and a grievance
procedure did not insulate the bank from liability where procedure re-
quired the plaintiff to report harassment actions to her supervisor, who
was the one engaging in the harassment.232
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment in a separate opinion in
which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. The main point
of Marshall's opinion was to argue for adoption of the EEOC guidelines
imposing liability on the employer for acts of sexual harassment commit-
ted by supervisors regardless of whether the employer knew or should
have known of their occurrence. 33 I rated this decision as a substantive
expansion of Title VII, since it recognized hostile-environment type ac-
tions and moved past the voluntariness standard to the issue of unwel-
come advances regardless of ultimate consent.
Bazemore v. Friday2 34 was announced on July 1, 1986. Suit was initi-
ated by black employees and the United States alleging a pattern and
practice of racial discrimination in employment and provision of services
by the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service.235 The district
court declined to certify a class, entered judgment for defendants in all
respects, and ruled against individual claimants on all discrimination
claims. On appeal, the lower court was affirmed. 3 6 The Supreme Court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. A unanimous Court
held that the court of appeals erred in holding that the defendant had no
229. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
230. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
231. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68.
232. Id. at 67-73.
233. Id. at 74-78 (Marshall, J., concurring). The majority of the Court refrained from
passing on the standard for imposing liability on the employer bank, merely rejecting the
extreme positions of no liability absent actual knowledge and of strict liability. Id- at 72.
234. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
235. Id. at 388-89.
236. Bazemore v. Friday, 151 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984).
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duty to eradicate salary disparities that had their origins before the effec-
tive date of Title VII, that failure of regression analyses to include all
variables affected probity of analyses but not admissibility, and that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence showing that past salary equaliza-
tion efforts of the defendant were insufficient . 3 7 By a 5-4 margin, the
Court, for reasons stated by Justice White, held that the Extension Ser-
vice was not required to do anything more than disband segregated 4-H
and Homemaker Clubs and establish racially neutral membership stan-
dards in order to correct prior discrimination.3 8 Based on evidentiary
holdings, I rated this decision as a procedural expansion of Title VII.
F. October 1986 Term
Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,2 9 announced on Novem-
ber 17, 1986, started when a teacher filed suit alleging that the employing
school board's policy of only allowing use of three days of paid leave for
religious observance and not allowing three days of paid leave for per-
sonal business for religious observance violated Title VII.24 0 The major-
ity restricted Title VII by finding that the school district was not in
violation; they held that the employer made a reasonable accommoda-
tion of religious practices, satisfying Title VII. The case was ordered
back to district court for further fact finding.241
The actual split of the Court can be described as 1-7-1. Justice Mar-
shall fied a dissenting opinion arguing that the employer had the burden
of proving everything possible had been done to accommodate an em-
ployee's religious needs.242 On the other hand, Justice Stevens's dissent
argued the decision was not narrow enough. He thought the Court
should have simply reversed the judgment, not sent it back for further
proceeding. 4 3
In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,2' a plurality
held that the California state statute that required employers to provide
leave and reinstatement to workers disabled by pregnancy was not pre-
empted by Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
237. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386-87.
238. Id. at 387-88.
239. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
240. Id. at 63.
241. IdL at 68-71.
242. I& at 72-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 75-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
244. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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because it was not inconsistent with the purpose of the federal statute.2 45
(The 6-3 split disregards section HI-A, which is a procedural issue.) This
outcome reaffirmed the status quo of Title VII legislation. Justice White,
wanting to narrow the issue, filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by
Justices Powell and Rehnquist. 46 They argued that Title VII prohibited
preferential treatment of pregnant workers and that the majority was
purporting to authorize employers to commit an unfair employment
practice outlawed by Title VII. The basis of the dissent's position was
that the California law did not require employers to provide equivalent
benefits for disabilities of other workers, and, consequently, discrimi-
nated in favor of women in violation of Title VII's prohibition of prefer-
ential treatment.247
The United States v. Paradise'~ decision addressed a consent order
imposing a one-for-one promotion policy on the Alabama Department
of Public Safety, which required that one qualified black state trooper be
promoted to corporal for every white trooper promoted. The five-justice
majority held that race-conscious relief in this case did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was
narrowly drawn to promote a compelling governmental interest.249 The
majority ruling expanded the reading of Title VII by protecting race-
conscious remedies from allegations of reverse discrimination. Justices
White and O'Connor both wrote dissenting opinions; Justice O'Connor's
opinion was joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist."
A 6-3 split of the Supreme Court resulted in an expansion of Title
VII in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Califor-
nia.2 5' Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that consideration of an
employee's gender for hiring and promotion did not violate Title VII as
long as the approach brought a gradual, remedial improvement in the
representation of minorities and women in the work force; the majority
considered such a plan to be consistent with Title VII.2 12 Justice White
245. Id. at 288.
246. Id. at 297 (White, J., dissenting).
247. Id
248. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). For a decidedly critical analysis of this decision, see Lino A.
Graglia, The "Remedy" Rationale for Requiring or Permitting Otherwise Prohibited Discrimi-
nation: How the Court Overcame the Constitution and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 22 Sui''oLK
U. L. REv. 569, 596-618 (1989).
249. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166-70.
250. Id at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
251. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
252. Id at 640-42.
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wrote a dissenting opinion" Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist." 4
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.2 55 raised two independent points of
argument. The first related to a civil rights issue beyond the scope of this
Article. The Title VII issue in this case involved unions' liability in em-
ployee representation. The majority opinion by Justice White held that
the union's rejection of disparate treatment grievances presented by
blacks, solely because claims that alleged racial bias were "troublesome"
to process, violated Title VII. 6 This holding expanded Title VII. Jus-
tice Powell, who was joined by Justice Scalia, dissented.z 7
A unanimous Court reaffirmed the status quo in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of The Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.258 The
Court upheld the exemption of secular, nonprofit activities of religious
employers from the Title VII religious discrimination provisions.259 The
case originated when various employees were discharged from secular
employment by non-profit church related organizations because they
lost their "temple recommends," which indicated good standing in the
church by behavior such as tithing and abstaining from alcohol and to-
bacco.260 The former employees brought a class action alleging that the
1972 amendments to section 702 were an unconstitutional violation of
the Establishment Clause. Summary judgment for plaintiffs was entered
by the district court.261 The Supreme Court, Justice White writing the
opinion, reversed.2 62 Although the 1972 amendments greatly expanded
the exemptions from Title VII, thereby restricting the reach of the act,
that restriction was accomplished by Congress; I consequently classed
this decision as upholding the status quo since the Court did not itself
promote any restriction of the law.
253. IM at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
254. Id at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
256. Id. at 669.
257. I1& at 680 (Powell, ., dissenting).
258. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
259. IM. at 343.
260. Id. at 330-31.
261. Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 831 (D. Utah 1984); Amos v.
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church, 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1030 (D. Utah 1985).
262. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330.
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G. October 1987 Term
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion from denial of certiorari in
McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Ass'n Council.2 6 3 The petition for
certiorari asked the Court to resolve a split in the circuits on a plaintiff's
Title VII standard of proof. The Seventh Circuit required a plaintiff to
establish that an employer's discriminatory intent was the "but for"
cause of the adverse employment decision, but the Eighth Circuit only
required a plaintiff to establish that discriminatory motive was a deter-
mining factor in such a job decision.2"4 Justice White strongly felt that
the Court should decide the issue of causation once and for all. Appar-
ently, the other eight justices were not yet ready to tackle that issue. The
McQuillen case reaffirmed the status quo. In hindsight, this dissent may
have foreshadowed the Court's opinions in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust 65 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.266
In a 5-3 split of the Court, the decision in EEOC v. Commercial Of-
fice Products Co. 267 reaffirmed the status quo on the time lines for filing
a Title VII complaint. A plurality opinion by Justice Marshall held that a
state's decision to waive the sixty-day period pursuant to a work-sharing
agreement with the EEOC terminated the agency's proceedings so the
EEOC could immediately process the charges; a complainant, who filed
timely under the state law, was entitled to the 300-day extended filing
period of Title VII.2 68 Justice O'Connor concurred in part and in the
judgment;269 Justices Stevens, Rehnquist and Scalia dissented.27
Anthony Kennedy did not participate.271
A narrow ruling, which only applied to the United States Postal Ser-
vice, resulted from Loeffler v. Frank.272 A five-Justice majority held that
prejudgment interest could be awarded in suits against the U.S. Postal
Service brought under Title VII and that sovereign immunity was not
available as a defense to the claim.273 Justice Blackmun wrote for the
majority; Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Rehnquist and
263. 487 U.S. 1211 (1988).
264. Id. at 1224 (White, J., dissenting).
265. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). See infra part IV.
266. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See infra part IV.
267. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
268. Id. at 115, 125.
269. Id at 125 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
270. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id at 125.
272. 486 U.S. 549 (1988).
273. Id at 565.
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O'Connor joined.274 This ruling neither expanded nor restricted Title
VII.
In Florida v. Long,275 two independent Title VII issues were ex-
amined. Because of the distinct differences between the topics, this case
was treated as two separate cases. The first issue was procedural and
established the effective date for gender-based discrimination in pension
funds.276 An 8-1 Court, with only Justice Stevens dissenting, affirmed
the status quo in concluding that the Florida optional retirement plan
did violate Title VII legislation.2 77 The second part of the case resulted
in a restriction of Title VII. The five-justice majority, led by Justice Ken-
nedy, held that employees who retired before the effective date of Nor-
ris278 were not entitled to a re-adjusted benefits payment structure.279
Justice Stevens dissented,280 as did Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and
Brennan.l8
A black woman brought suit against her employer alleging racial dis-
crimination in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.2 2 ' The case was
treated as two separate Title VII cases for purposes of this analysis.
First, Justice O'Connor led a unanimous eight-member Court (without
participation of Justice Kennedy) to an expansion of Title VII. The
court held that disparate impact analysis may be properly applied to a
subjective or discretionary promotion system, as opposed to using a dis-
parate treatment model.2-
A 4-4 split restricting Title VII occurred in the second part of the
case, which addressed the correct standards for the plaintiff's burden of
proof. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Stevens held that the
initial burden of proof was carried when the plaintiff established numeri-
cally that facially neutral hiring practices generated discriminatory pat-
terns, but the ultimate burden of proof still remained with the
plaintiff.284 The dissent believed that the plurality was blurring the dis-
tinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment forms of dis-
274. IA at 566 (White, J., dissenting).
275. 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
276. Id. at 237-38.
277. Id at 235.
278. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
279. Long, 487 U.S. at 240.
280. Id at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Id at 240 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
282. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
283. Id- at 990-91.
284. Id. at 994-97.
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crimination.2 85 The implications of this case are discussed at length in
Section VI.
H. October 1988 Term
In the sex-discrimination case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 86 a
female associate was refused admission as a partner in a public account-
ing firm.287 A six-justice majority, led by Justice Brennan, expanded Ti-
tle VII by holding that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proved that
her gender played a part in the employment decision, the defendant
could avoid a finding of liability by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same employment decision
without such impermissible considerations of gender.28 Dissenting Jus-
tices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia argued that the final burden of
proof belonged to the plaintiff, not the defendant partnership.289
Even though statistical evidence demonstrated a high percentage of
nonwhite workers in unskilled positions and a low percentage of such
workers in skilled positions in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,2 9° it
failed to establish a disparate impact case. The majority held that the
composition of the relevant labor market must be examined and ratified
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust from the previous term.291 Dissenting Justice Stevens, who was
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, argued that "in-
tent" should play no role in a disparate impact inquiry and that the ma-
jority was reducing the burden of proof for employers, making it harder
for employees to prove cases.292 This case is discussed at length in Sec-
tion VI.
By a 5-3 split in Lorance v. AT&T,29 the majority held that proof of
disparate impact was not sufficient to invalidate a seniority system; an
actual "intent to discriminate" must be proved.2 94 Justice Stevens wrote
a separate opinion concurring in the judgment on the basis of prior deci-
sions.295 Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice Marshall's dis-
285. Id. at 1001-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
286. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
287. Id. at 231-32.
288. 1I at 237-38.
289. Id. at 286-87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
290. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
291. 1I at 656-57.
292. Id. at 670-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
294. Id at 911-12.
295. Id at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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senting opinion. The dissent argued strongly that the majority opinion
rewarded those employers ingenious enough to cloak their acts of dis-
crimination in a facially neutral guise, although the effects may be dis-
criminatory.2 96 This case produced a restrictive reading of Title VII.
The high Court split 5-4 on a so-called reverse-discrimination deci-
sion announced the same day as Lorance, June 12, 1989. In Martin v.
Wilks,2 97 a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that white
firefighters, who had failed to intervene in an earlier employment dis-
crimination proceeding in which consent decrees established hiring and
promotion goals for black fire fighters, were not estopped to subse-
quently challenge employment decisions taken by Alabama municipali-
ties pursuant to those consent decrees.298 The district court had
dismissed the action as an "impermissible collateral attack," but the
court of appeals reversed that dismissal.299 Rehnquist, citing a 1940 deci-
sion, held that "one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litiga-
tion in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been
made a party by service of process."300 Justice Stevens entered a vigor-
ous dissenting opinion, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
which stated, in part, that:
[I]n a case such as these, however, in which there has been no
showing that the decree was collusive, fraudulent, transparently
invalid, or entered without jurisdiction, it would be "unconsciona-
ble" to conclude that obedience to an order remedying a Title VII
violation could subject a defendant to additional liability.301
Further, Stevens concluded that:
There is nothing unusual about the fact that litigation between
adverse parties may, as a practical matter, seriously impair the
interests of third persons who elect to sit on the sidelines. Indeed,
in complex litigation this Court has squarely held that a sideline-
sitter may be bound as firmly as an actual party if he had ade-
quate notice and a fair opportunity to intervene and if the judicial
interest in finality is sufficiently strong.
There is no need, however, to go that far in order to agree
with the District Court's eminently sensible view that compliance
with the terms of a valid decree remedying violations of Ttle VII
296. Id. at 917 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
297. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
298. Id at 767-68.
299. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498
(11th Cir. 1987).
300. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 761 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
301. Id at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cannot itself violate that statute or the Equal Protection
Clause.302
The majority opinion restricted the application and enforcement of Title
VII by opening up consent decrees to extensive collateral attack.
A 6-2 decision in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes30 3 restricted application of Title VII. The Court's opinion, written
by Justice Scalia, held that district courts may award attorney's fees
against those who are not charged with Title VII violations, but only if
the third party's action is found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or with-
out foundation. '30 4  Essentially, this rule insulates most intervenors
from the possibility of having fees imposed upon them. The decision
resulted in a dissent by Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justice Bren-
nan. Marshall argued that defendants could now rely on intervenors to
raise many of their defenses, thereby minimizing the fee exposure of de-
fendants and forcing the plaintiffs to litigate most of their claims against
parties from whom they have no chance of recovering fees.3 °5
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF VOTING PATTERNS ON THE HIGH COURT
A. Voting Patterns - 1981-85
1. Method of Analysis
A Lexis search limited to U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1979 to
July 1985, using the search term "Title VII and employ! with/discrimi-
nate!" generated sixty-seven cases. Of these sixty-seven cases, analysis
revealed that there were twenty-six relevant full-opinion Title VII cases
and six Title VII cases involving a denial of certiorari in which one or
more of the justices filed an opinion. In all, there were thirty-two rele-
vant cases with opinions.
For preliminary analysis, a spread sheet was generated on which the
Court's action was characterized as either expanding Title VII, restrict-
ing Title VII, or affirming the status quo. Two of the cases generated
entries in more than one column. In the Stotts30 6 case, I believe that the
seniority override of the consent decree was an affirmation of the status
quo; however, the tone of the opinion by Justice White contained some
"reverse discrimination" language and substantial sympathy for the ar-
guments of "innocent victims," by which he meant more senior employ-
302. Id at 792 (citations omitted).
303. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
304. Id at 766.
305. Id at 770-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
306. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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ees who had not participated in discriminatory employment decisions,
thereby engendering a mark in the column for restrictive Title VII appli-
cations. In the Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown30 7 case, the
per curiam decision, which provoked a dissent by Justice Stevens, mer-
ited a mark in the column for restricting Title VII because the Court
very narrowly read the ninety-day jurisdictional filing requirement in the
context of the in forma pauperis petition; at the same time, a less critical
reading of the case suggested that it, in part, affirmed the status quo of a
strict adherence to the ninety-day requirement in EEOC cases. All
other cases generated only single entries.
Totalling the characterizations for the relevant Title VII cases since
the November 1980 elections produced a profile of eleven marks for an
expanded interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, six marks for a
restricted reading of Title VII, and seventeen marks for an affirmation of
the status quo. Of the eleven cases that expanded Title VII interpreta-
tion and enforcement, it should be emphasized that five of these cases
involved procedural, jurisdictional, or other technical matters, not the
substance of Title VII as such. Deleting these procedural and technical
expansions of Title VII left just six cases in five years in which the Court
expanded the federal law for eliminating employment discrimination.
Of the six cases that restricted Title VII application, one of the cases
involved procedural restrictions; thus, the Court gave us five decisions
which involved a substantive restriction of Title VII. The results seem to
be evenly balanced. However, the amount of division within the Court
on the subject of Title VII issues was remarkable.
This Article will now examine how the Justices voted on the six cases
that expanded the application of Title VII and on the five cases that
provided a restrictive reading of Title VII (see Tables III and IV). For
purposes of this Article, three of the six expansive cases involved unani-
mous votes. Therefore, the most conservative or restrictive posture on
these six cases would be three votes with the majority and three votes in
dissent. Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell achieved that particular
status. The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor were only slightly less
conservative. Retired Justice Potter Stewart came to bat once and con-
curred in a dissenting opinion. The balance of the five justices all voted
six to nothing with the majority on the six cases that expanded Title VII;
they were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Since the October 1980 Term, five cases had been decided that re-
stricted the application or interpretation of Title VII. On those five
307. 466 U.S. 147 (1984).
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TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL VOTES ON
Six EXPANSIVE CASES*
VoTE WITH
MAJORITY DIssEiNT
Burger 4 2
Brennan 6 0
White 6 0
Marshall 6 0
Rehnquist 3 3
Blackmun 6 0
Powell 3 3
Stevens 6 0
O'Connor 4 1
Stewart 0 1
*On the Arizona Governmental Committee
case, the Court's vote on retroactivity is
ignored; the result is that three of the cases that
expanded Title VII interpretation are treated in
this table as unanimous.
TABLE IV
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL VOTES ON
FIVE RESTRICTED CASES
VoTE wITH
MAJORITY DissENT
Burger 5 0
Brennan 0 5
White 5 0
Marshall 0 5
Rehnquist 5 0
Blackmun 1 4
Powell 5 0
Stevens 2 3
O'Connor 5 0
cases, five of the Justices had a perfect voting record, voting with the
majority on all five cases; they were the Chief Justice, Justices White,
Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Stevens voted twice with the
majority to restrict Title VII and dissented in three cases. Justice Black-
mun voted only once with the majority to restrict Title VII and dissented
in the other four cases. Justices Brennan and Marshall had matching
records of dissenting in all five cases.
The above analysis of individual voting habits suggests that the Court
as of July 1985 could be arranged into two voting blocks with a single
swing vote deciding the substantive cases in the Title VII area from Oc-
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tober 1980 until July 1985. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and
Blackmun represented the active or expansionist forces for Title VII on
the Court. Justice Blackmun is only slightly more cautious than Brennan
and Marshall; Justice Stevens is only slightly more cautious than Black-
mun. On the other side, four voices on the Court urged either a restric-
tive or nonexpansive reading of Title VII; they were Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Rehnquist, Powell and O'Connor. Justice O'Connor was
slightly less conservative than Rehnquist and Powell, and Chief Justice
Burger could have been located somewhere between her views and the
views of Rehnquist and Powell, who seemed fully committed to restrict-
ing Title VII. In the middle, having the single vote that determined the
outcome in all disputed Title VII cases between 1980 and 1985 was Jus-
tice Byron White. Justice White had the singular distinction of voting
with the majority on all eleven cases between October 1980 and July
1985 in which the Court had a substantive impact on the application and
enforcement of Title VII. Thus, an attorney preparing a Title VII case
for the U.S. Supreme Court in the October 1985 Term should have been
fully informed on Justice White's views before submitting any argument
to the Court.3 °8
2. Outlook at End of October 1984 Term
Between October 1980 and July 1985, six cases (Hishon,30 9 Arizona
Governing Committee,310 Newport News Ship Building,31 1 Teal,3"2
Sumitomo, 31 3 and Gunther3 4) expanded the reach of Title VII. Five
cases (Stotts,315 Baldwin,316 Ford,317 Kremer,318 and American To-
bacco319) restricted the jurisdiction, operation, and interpretation of Ti-
tle VII. None of the decisions studied directly addressed the issues that
raged in the media in the summer of 1985, ignited by the nomination of
William Bradford Reynolds to the number-three post at the Justice De-
308. Lance Liebman, Justice White and the Affirmative Action, 58 U. CoLo. L. RFv. 471
(1987).
309. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
310. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
311. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
312. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
313. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
314. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
315. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
316. 466 U.S. 147 (1984).
317. 458 U.S. 219 (1983).
318. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
319. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
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partment. Reynolds, and by implication his superiors, Meese and Presi-
dent Reagan, sought to re-argue the question of affirmative action
quotas and time tables under Title VII. Nothing so fundamental or basic
was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court during the first Reagan term.
Most of the decisions by the Court in this period addressed narrowly
drawn issues. Moreover, a fair reading of the decisions indicates that the
Court was not amenable to making such a revolutionary change in the
application and enforcement of Title VII. Consequently, Reynolds,
Meese, and President Reagan had to look elsewhere for relief.
My review of Title VII enforcement during Ronald Reagan's first
term suggests that the administration's bombastic rhetoric and highly
visible public proffle were not significantly transformed into action by
the EEOC directly or by legal interpretation of Title VII by the U.S.
Supreme Court (see Table V for summary.) This finding is consistent
with other observations made about the impact of President Carter's ac-
tivist stance on civil rights enforcement.2
B. Voting Patterns - 1985-89
The Lexis search of Title VII cases during Ronald Reagan's second
term (1985-89) was done in the same manner as the first search.3 ' Only
eighteen relevant cases were found out of the thirty-four Supreme Court
citations generated. Two of these cases, Florida v. Long, and Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust,323 were treated as two separate cases because
they addressed more than one Title VII issue. Therefore, voting patterns
on twenty separate cases were generated and analyzed. Of the twenty
decisions, six expanded Title VII, seven restricted it, and seven reaf-
firmed the status quo. This study focused on voting patterns in the ex-
pansive or restrictive cases involving the substance of Title VII (see
Table V for summary.)
Looking at the voting patterns on significant cases decided between
November 1986 and June 1987, the Court appeared to be split into three
distinct voting blocks. On the right were Justices Rehnquist and Scalia,
who favored restriction of Title VII. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Black-
mun and Stevens held the seats of the liberal, or left wing, working to
expand Title VII protection. Justices O'Connor, White, and Powell pro-
320. See William A. Wines, EEOC Conciliation Efforts in the Case of the Willmar Eight,
34 LAB. L.J. 308 (1984).
321. See supra part IV.A.
322. 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
323. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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TABLE V
COMPARISON OF DECISIONS BY TERM
Expand Restrict Affirm
VII VII Status Quo
October 1980 Term
Substantive 1 0 3
Procedural I I I
October 1981 Term
Substantive 2 3 2
Procedural 1 0 1
October 1982 Term
Substantive 2 0 2
Procedural 1 0 0
October 1983 Term
Substantive 1 2 4
Procedural 2 0 0
October 1984 Term
Substantive 0 0 3
Procedural 0 0 0
October 1985 Term
Substantive 1 1 1
Procedural 1 0 1
October 1986 Term
Substantive 3 1 1
Procedural 0 0 0
October 1987 Term
Substantive 0 2 1
Procedural 0 2 2
October 1988 Term
Substantive 0 0 0
Procedural 1 4 0
vided the swing votes that influenced results in either direction depend-
ing on the issues at hand. In the three expansive cases during this time
period, Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens all had per-
fect voting patterns with the majority. Only Justice Scalia dissented in
all three cases, while Justice Rehnquist dissented in two and voted for
the expansion of Title VII in one case. The swing voters were not influ-
enced consistently in any of the cases. Justices White and O'Connor
voted with the majority once, dissenting twice; Justice Powell voted with
the majority twice, and dissented once. One restrictive case, which ad-
dressed an issue of reasonable accommodation for an employee's reli-
gious beliefs, did not generate a voting pattern that matched this
proposed voting model. In that case, Ansonia Board of Education v.
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Philbrook,32 4 Justices Stevens and Marshall dissented while the other
seven made up the majority.325
The arrangement of the Supreme Court in voting blocks shifted when
President Reagan's appointee Justice Anthony Kennedy replaced Justice
Powell in February 1988.326 With this new conservative, the right-wing
block consisted of three Justices, leaving only Justices White and
O'Connor as the two swing voters. Nine cases between February 1988
and April 1990 were examined. Three decisions expanded and six re-
stricted Title VII. Two of the expansive cases were decided by a unani-
mous Court. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens were
sufficiently influential to gain both swing votes, leaving a perfect right-
wing block in dissent. In the six restrictive cases, Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Kennedy had perfect voting records with the majority (Ken-
nedy only participated in five decisions). Justices Marshall and Brennan
dissented in all six cases, while Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented
in only five. Justice O'Connor voted restrictively in the five cases in
which she participated; Justice White joined the majority with his swing
vote five of the six times.
The analysis discovered no discernible pattern for swing votes in the
Title VII cases from November 1986 to June 1987. Justice O'Connor
seemed to be more independent of the conservative block at a time
when Justice White was apparently re-examining his earlier posture on
Title VII and drifting into a more conservative position. After February
1988, Justices O'Connor and White voted together on twelve out of the
fourteen Title VII cases (eighty-six percent of the time). The way in
which they voted determined the outcome in almost every case. Their
combined vote was determinative in the two crucial cases that signalled a
re-examination of the entire disparate impact doctrine, Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust327 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.31
V. A LOOK AT ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION SINCE 1980
This part of the Article reviews the Reagan Administration's record
in the area of support for the enforcement activities of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, the U.S. government's enforcement
324. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
327. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
328. 490 U.S. 462 (1989).
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arm for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the evident
trends was a 48% increase in the charges received for processing by the
EEOC between fiscal years 1979 and 1984. Funding for the EEOC was
$106.75 million in fiscal year 1979 and $152.0 million in fiscal year 1984,
an actual increase of 42% before inflation. The real increase in funding
would be only about half of the actual or gross increase; thus, the U.S.
government during the first Reagan administration had met a 48% in-
crease in case load at the EEOC with a real funding increase of slightly
over 20%.
Although there had been a dramatic increase in the number of com-
plaints filed under Title VII since 1982, our review of the number of
charges filed and processed by the Commission back to 1976 suggests
that the numbers were still well within the avalanche of complaints
which had been filed in the initial years of the Commission (see Table
IV). The 1982 date may be significant for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is that 1982 was the year that the Equal Rights Amend-
ment failed.329 Other possible explanations for the statistical turn-
around in 1982 may include the administration's continuing attack on the
doctrines of comparable worth and other feminist issues, and the percep-
tion by many employees that they were going to have to seek relief from
the courts rather than waiting for a broad-based attack on discrimination
from the Reagan Administration.
What were the causes of the Reagan funding shortfall for enforce-
ment of equal opportunity in employment? This question can be ad-
dressed by examining the ideology and rhetoric of the Reagan
Administration officials. What emerges is a rather strong bias against
government involvement in free markets and a particularly keen belief
that affirmative action, which the Reaganites saw as tied irrevocably to
quotas, should be abolished. These ideological positions are matched by
a belief that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted in the same
manner as it was by the founding fathers in 1789.330 Finally, the Reagan
329. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Time Runs Out for Proposed Rights Amendment, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1982, at A12.
330. Garry Wills makes an excellent point when he says that "Edwin Meese and other
'original intent' conservatives also want to go back before the Civil War amendments (particu-
larly the Fourteenth) to the original founders. Their job would be comparatively easy if they
did not have to work against the values created by the Gettysburg Address." GARRY WrLs,
LINCOLN AT GErTSBURG: THE WoRDs THAT REMADE AMERICA 39 (1992). Wills goes on
to explain that equality was not mentioned in the Constitution. Lincoln, over the period of the
1850s and up to the Gettysburg Address in November 1863, hammered out a new political
ideology in which the phrase "all men are created equal" from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence was grafted onto and made part of our political heritage as if it had been in the Consti-
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
appointment record, especially in the area of judicial appointments,
failed to mirror the racial and gender diversity of the U.S. public. This
section concludes by addressing some of the legal and political issues
raised by the Reagan administration's activities in the area of equal em-
ployment opportunity.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's fiscal years have
run from October 1 through September 30 since 1976.331 In the middle
of President Reagan's two terms, it appeared that the public rhetoric
from such administration figures as Edwin Meese, the Attorney General;
William Bradford Reynolds, Meese's chief deputy for civil rights; and
Clarence Pendleton, chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission,
were not being transformed into public law. Court decisions refused to
embrace the position of the administration on Title VII in areas such as
affirmative action and requiring identified discriminatees. However, the
budget of the EEOC, adjusted for inflation and case load, had dropped
35.4% from 1979 to 1984. Thus, as late as 1987, it appeared that the
Reagan administration had deftly created a major public rhetoric distur-
bance as a tactical diversion for its main thrust, which consisted of qui-
etly "gutting" the enforcement budget. Due to a downturn in filings, this
fiscal trend had rebounded somewhat after 1985 and by 1988 was only
14.5% below the adjusted budget in real terms for 1979 (see accompany-
ing graphs.)
A Time magazine 332 survey asked the following question with these
results:
'Do blacks in the U.S. have same opportunities
as whites in employment?"
RESPONSE: Blacks Whites
Same 26% 59%
NOT the case 71% 37%
This survey information highlighted one of the main obstacles to en-
forcement of Title VII: Many whites perceive the situation as better for
blacks in employment than blacks find it. This misconception defused
popular efforts to get the Reagan Administration more involved in Title
VII enforcement.
tution all the time. Later, Wills declares: "For most people now, the Declaration means what
Lincoln told us it means, as a way of correcting the Constitution itself without overthrowing it.
It is this correction of the spirit, this intellectual revolution, that makes attempts to go back
beyond Lincoln to some earlier version so feckless." Id at 147.
331. 1976 EEOC Ann. Rep. The 1976 fiscal year was 15 months to accommodate the
initial transition. Id
332. Otto Friedrich, Racism on the Rise, TIME, Feb. 2, 1987, at 18, 21.
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In the area of civil rights, the second Reagan Administration seemed
content to be looking backwards anyway. Witness the statements of At-
torney General Edwin Meese III, Reagan's chief law enforcement of-
ficer, to the American Bar Association on July 9, 1985:
In my opinion a drift back toward the radical egalitarianism and
expansive civil libertarianism of the Warren Court would once
again be a threat to the notion of limited but energetic
government.
What, then, should a constitutional jurisprudence actually be?
It should be a Jurisprudence of Original Intention. By seeking to
judge policies in light of principles, rather than remold principles
in light of policies, the Court could avoid both the charge of inco-
herence and the charge of being either too conservative or too
liberal [emphasis in original].
... To allow the courts to govern simply by what it [sic] views
at the time as fair and decent, is a scheme of government no
longer popular; the idea of democracy has suffered. The perma-
nence of the Constitution has been weakened. A Constitution
that is viewed as only what the judges say it is, is no longer a
constitution in the true sense.
Those who framed the Constitution chose their words care-
fully; they debated at great length the most minute points. The
language they chose meant something. It is incumbent upon the
Court to determine what that meaning was. This is not a shocking
new theory; nor is it arcane or archaic.333
Apparently, the Constitution should be changed only by amendment.
The thrust of the Court's constitutional power should be to limit govern-
mental power in keeping with Mr. Meese's ideas.
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reyn-
olds carried the ideological battle to the law schools in a 1986 speech to
the Federalist Society in Chicago. According to Reynolds, most law
professors are "aligned philosophically with the liberal left" and are
more concerned with "cultivating new recruits" to that ideology than
they are with teaching the Constitution.334 The previous month, Meese
333. Attorney General E. Meese III, Address Before the American Bar Association
Meeting (July 17, 1985).
334. Robin Wilson, Law Professors Assailed as Leftists by Justice Department Official,
CHRON. OF IGHRR EDUC., Nov. 26, 1986, at 22.
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had alleged that Supreme Court rulings that interpreted the Constitution
were not the "supreme law of the land." '335
Asserting that the Supreme Court had sometimes aggrandized its
own role, Meese assailed what he called a tendency of some senators and
others to place judicial rulings "on a par with the Constitution. ' '336 The
Tulane speech expanded on critiques of the Court that Meese had made
since 1985 by suggesting that a Supreme Court decision "binds the par-
ties in the case and also the executive branch for whatever enforcement
is necessary," but that "such a decision does not establish a 'supreme law
of the land' that is binding on all persons and parts of government,
henceforth and forevermore. 3 37
Rather than "submit to government by the judiciary," Meese argued
that citizens should respond with active disagreement. For instance, the
Attorney General asserted that legislators might properly propose bills
contrary to Supreme Court decisions in recognition that those "decisions
do not necessarily determine future public policy. '338 He added that
"[e]ach of the three coordinate [sic] branches of government created and
empowered by the Constitution - the executive and legislative no less
than the judicial - has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the per-
formance of its official functions. ' 3 3 9 Meese seemed unaware that this
argument had been advanced before and was laid to rest by the Court in
1803.340
Continuing the attack on the legal establishment initiated by his boss,
William Bradford Reynolds asserted that the Constitution itself, by
which he meant its history, text, and the intentions of its framers, had
become a matter of "passing interest to only a handful of law profes-
sors."'341 Most law schools, Reynolds alleged, approached the Constitu-
tion "in a haphazard fashion, leaving it to each professor to shape the
curriculum according to his or her favorite, or least favorite, collection of
cases." 342 In so doing, Mr. Reynolds continued, law schools have "abdi-
cated their responsibility to educate the future members of our profes-
sion on the Constitution."' 3
335. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Meese Says Rulings by U.S. High Court Don't Establish Law, N.Y.
TimFs, Oct. 23, 1986, at Al.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at A20.
339. Id.
340. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
341. Wilson, supra note 334.
342. Meese, supra note 333.
343. Wilson, supra note 334.
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Does any hope remain for this Republic if the "One True Meaning"
of the Constitution has been lost?3 " True to a white, male-conscious-
ness pattern, Meese, Reynolds, and President Reagan embraced a notion
that constitutional law boiled down to an either-or understanding of the
Constitution. For them, one must either embrace the Constitution as the
founding fathers understood it or be in error. There is a right and a
wrong way, a binary way to approach the thing.34 As Anne Wilson
Schaef indicates, such dualistic thinking is efficient, but at the cost of
oversimplifying alternatives. It reduces thought into a binary system in-
capable of entertaining multiple "right" solutions.346
From the perspective of white, male consciousness, if women's work
is elevated, it must be at the cost of devaluing men's work.347 Thus, it is
symptomatic of the white, male consciousness that opponents of affirma-
tive action see themselves "protecting" men from "reverse discrimina-
tion" and from hiring systems that no longer, in their opinion, look for
qualified job candidates. People with a white, male outlook do not easily
embrace the notion of hiring one from a number of qualified candidates;
the white, male system insists on reducing alternatives to two and then
placing those alternatives in a hierarchy 48 Female consciousness is
more accepting of peer relationships and multiple "right" solutions. 49
Thus, white, male consciousness seems an ideal stage on which to enter-
tain the Reagan policies on Title VII.
The Justice Department, encouraged by Justice White's language in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 350 mounted an aggressive
campaign for a broad repudiation of affirmative action. The U.S.
Supreme Court's rejection of that administrative position was signaled
by three decisions in the October 1985 Term but even more emphatically
in the October 1986 Term by the decision of Johnson v. Santa Clara
Transportation Agency.31 In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court by a 6-3
vote established the broad principle that employers who have not previ-
ously discriminated against women and minority groups could give mem-
344. Meese, supra note 333.
345. ANNE WILSON SCHAEF, WOMEN'S REALIrry: AN EMERGING FEMALE SYSTEM IN THE
WHrrE MA SocmTy (1981).
346. Id at 149.
347. Id. at 104-07.
348. Id. at 99-143.
349. Id. at 149-51.
350. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
351. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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bers of those groups preferences in hiring and promotions to promote
balance in traditionally segregated job categories. 2
Barry Goldstein, a lawyer with the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund, greeted the Johnson353 decision with the opinion that the
Administration's campaign may have helped the Court move off the
fence. He stated:
I think the extreme position of the Justice Department in the last
six years, just categorically saying that affirmative action was un-
necessary, that it was illegal and immoral, was counterproductive
and helped to define the issue clearly for the Court. It looked at
the Justice Department position and saw that it had no
substance.354
Terry Eastland, the Justice Department's top spokesman, responded
to such criticism by saying that the Department would continue to argue
for its reading of the Constitution and precedents. Asked how the Ad-
ministration might hope to regain the ground it had lost in recent deci-
sions, Eastland replied, "a new appointment or two. '3 55
Eastland may have been overly pessimistic about the Reagan Admin-
istration's success in foiling enforcement of Title VII. Even though, as of
1986, it had not yet prevailed in the high Court, the Reagan Administra-
tion had slowed down progress in the elimination of discrimination from
the workplace. One of the ways that the Administration was effective
was in limiting the budget for the EEOC, the enforcement arm of Title
VII. Moreover, even though the gross budget increases did not keep
pace with the increased filings of Title VII complaints, the matter wors-
ens when the budget is adjusted for inflation.
352. Id- at 637. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Court's Change of Course, N.Y. TMNES, March 27,
1987, at Al.
353. Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
354. Taylor, supra note 335, at A17.
355. Id.
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TABLE VI
BUDGET, CPI INDEX, AND FILINGs
Unadjusted Inflation
Budget Adjusted
per 1000 CPI Deflator Budget
# of Budget complaints all Change with 1979 per 1000
Year Complaints (millios) (millions) items per year as base year complaints
78 67.7
79 32,279 $106.75 $3.03 76.7 13.29% 1.0000 $3.03
80 45,382 $134.31 $2.96 86.3 12.52% 0.8748 $2.59
81 44,992 $137.88 $3.06 94.0 8.92% 0.7968 $2.44
82 41,629 $140.96 $3.39 97.6 3.83% 0.7663 $2.59
83 50,506 $147.42 $2.92 101.3 3.79% 0.7372 $2.15
84 52,130 $154.04 $2.95 105.3 3.95% 0.7081 $2.09
85 53,343 $163.66 $3.07 109.3 3.80% 0.6812 $2.09
86 50,110 $157.91 $3.15 110.5 1.10% 0.6737 $2.12
87 45,401 $169.53 $3.73 115.4 4.43% 0.6439 $2.40
88 42,657 $179.81 $4.22 120.5 4.42% 0.6154 $2.59
1. Source: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of
the United States Government (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), for Fiscal
Years 1987, 1988, 1989.
2. Budget divided by number of Title VII complaints multiplied by 1000.
3. United States Department of Labor, CPI Detailed Report, (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1989), 16.
Finally, to put the increased case load and the decreased purchasing
power in perspective, look at the budget in real terms per one thousand
cases.
More difficult to measure, but perhaps more insidious, was the social
impact that the Reagan Administration position had on affirmative ac-
tion. In the 1970s, racial slurs and jokes seemed an endangered spe-
cies.356 That no longer appears to be the case. The Meese-Reagan-
Reynolds-Regan public utterances have rehabilitated some forms of ra-
cism and sexism. Moreover, given the public opposition from the Rea-
gan administration to affirmative action and the underfunding of the
enforcement mechanism, employers no longer have much to worry'
about when it comes to federal enforcement of the antidiscrimination
employment laws.35 7 These assertions are supported by a variety of sta-
tistical indicators.
356. JomsoN, supra note 23, at 203, 469-70.
357. One EEOC employee, who for obvious reasons asked to remain anonymous, told
this researcher that field investigators who proved "too enthusiastic about enforcement" often
found themselves reassigned to answering telephones at the home office.
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Graph A
EEOC Budget in Real Terms per 1000 Title VII Complaints
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Look at the figures for the number of women and minorities in U.S.
graduate schools: the number of women increased by 7.8% from 1976-77
to 1984-85; blacks declined by 19.2%; Hispanics increased 20.4%; and
Asians increased by 54.4%. In absolute numbers, the drop in black en-
rollments in graduate schools was 12,518; the increase in Hispanics and
Asians combined totaled only 14,184.8
Women's wages in the U.S. as a percentage of men's wages by age of
the women start at 92% for women under 20 years of age, drop to 64%
by the time women are 35 to 44 years old, and finally drop to 61% for
women over 45 years of age.359 On the average, and the numbers are
worse in the South and the West, women at the vice-presidential level
and above make 42% less annually than men. 60
One survey of women executives found that more than half felt
blocked or delayed at one time in their careers because they were wo-
men, and 48% said they had received an unwanted sexual advance from
a superior or a client.3 61 Seventy-two percent of these women executives
358. Higher Education, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1986, at 37.
359. Women's Wages, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 23.
360. Women's Salaries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1987, at 31.
361. Cathy 'rost, A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in Offices, Fields and
Factories, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1986, at 1.
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said that reconciling home and work was difficult. 6 Yet despite these
problems, most of the women were "optimistic about the future, espe-
cially when men below 45 years of age today" move up the corporate
hierarchies. 63
It is, perhaps, difficult to over-estimate the negative impact that the
Reagan administration's position has had on social attitudes in the U.S.
The legitimatizing of racist and sexist attitudes has led to some ugly inci-
dents on college campuses and in corporate recruiting. 364 The Wall
Street Journal reported as early as 1986 the following recruitment
changes:
Recruiters say their clients rarely seek women or minority-group
members to fill management slots. Christian & Timbers Inc.
hasn't seen any such requests for two years, compared with a few
each year previously ....
The result of the silence: "White executives don't see the prob-
lem and blacks avoid going against the grain," says New Jersey
consultant Edward Jones Jr.365
VI. THE CASE OF WATSON V. FORT WORTH BANK & TRUSZ 66
The issue of whether subjective hiring practices are covered by Title
VII was presented to the Court in Watson;367 the plurality opinion by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor responded by reducing the burden of
proof initially established in Griggs v. Duke Power3 68 and by requiring
practice-by-practice statistical proof of causation even where such proof
may be impossible. 369 Without a fifth vote, however, this opinion did not
have any precedential value beyond the bare conclusion that the dispa-
362. Itt
363. Id.
364. See; eg., Martha ChamalIas, Evolving Concepts of Equality Under Title VII: Dispa-
rate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. RIv. 305
(1983); David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judi-
cial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 790 (1991); William N. Es-
kridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL.
L. REv. 613 (1991); Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Test-
ing, 104 HARv. L. RFv. 896 (1993); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill
of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 790 (1991); Constance B. Motley, The Supreme Court Civil
Rights Litigation, and Deja Vu, 76 ComsnLL L. REv. 643 (1990); Note, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. Rnv. 896 (1993).
365. Jeanne Saddler, A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in Offices, Fields
and Factories, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1986, at 1.
366. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
367. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
368. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
369. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-99.
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rate impact analysis applied to subjective hiring decisions, a judgment
concurred in by all eight justices.370
Much media attention was paid to the Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio371 case in the summer of 1989.372 Actually, the majority opinion
by Justice White mostly wrote Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in
Watson373 into law. Thus, this section focuses on the Watson opinion by
Justice O'Connor and analyzes the changes that it brought to Title VII
enforcement until Congress overrode it in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
In Watson, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of a black wo-
man who sued her former employer, a bank, alleging racial discrimina-
tion. The trial court entered judgment on the merits in favor of the
bank. On appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded. 374 This Article does not address the issues related to cer-
tification or decertification of a class of employees for purposes of a Title
VII action. Rather, it focuses on whether disparate impact analysis is an
appropriate vehicle for analyzing discretionary hiring practices under Ti-
tle VII and on what the appropriate standards for the burden of proof
should be.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the question of
whether a disparate impact analysis, historically used to statistically ex-
amine the role of standardized tests in employment screening, should
also be used to test subjective hiring and promotion practices. In a plu-
rality opinion, Justice O'Connor held that such analysis would be appro-
priate and went on to specify evidentiary burdens and allocate such
burdens to the parties. 375 Although agreeing that such analysis was ap-
propriate, a three-judge faction led by Justice Blackmun parted company
with O'Connor on the evidentiary analysis.376 Justice Stevens concurred
in judgment and wrote a separate opinion. 7 Justice Kennedy did not
participate.378 Thus, the Court split 4-3-1 on a potentially dramatic turn-
370. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Linda L. Holdeman, Watson v. Ft.
Worth Bank and Trust: The Changing Face of Disparate Impact, DENv. U. L. REv. 179 (1989).
371. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
372. See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1989, at A12; Martha Brannigan, EEOC, After Two Court Rulings, Weighs Damages to U.S.
Job Discrimination Suits, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1989, at B5; Stephen Wermeil, Justices Affirm
Interpretation of Rights Law, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1989, at A8.
373. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
374. Id. at 982-83.
375. Id at 1001.
376. 1& at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
377. Id. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring).
378. Id at 1000.
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ing point in judicial interpretation of Title VII. On June 5, 1989, when
the case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio3 79 was decided, the poten-
tial became law. The difference one year after Watson was the fifth vote
provided by Justice Kennedy, who had not participated in the first case.
This time, Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Blackmun, Marshall,
and Brennan joined. 8 °
The origin of this dispute is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which clearly outlawed intentional and overt (direct) discrimination in
the terms and conditions of employment based on race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex.38' What was not clear until 1971 was whether the
Act also reached indirect discrimination caused by employment screen-
ing using factors neutral on their face and not directly related to the job
that had a statistically negative impact on the protected classifications.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,3" the Supreme Court answered that ques-
tion unanimously by asserting that Title VII prohibited employers from
measuring the job applicant in the abstract, as opposed to measuring the
job applicant for the task.38 3 In a case that came to the Court in a diffi-
cult posture, namely, without any proof of intent to discriminate under
circumstances where a corporate attempt to evade the spirit of the law
was clearly indicated, the Court held that proof of intent to discriminate
was not a requirement where the other factors of "disparate impact"
were present.384 There has been much commentary on Griggs in law
379. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
380. Id at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
381. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1976).
382. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
383. Id at 434-36.
384. Id at 429-33.
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reviews,3"' and in keeping with the conservative fashion of the Reagan
era, some of the recent commentary has been decidedly critical.38 6
In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that the burden of proof was on
the employer to show the job-relatedness of employment criteria that
statistically discriminated against protected groups.387 In her plurality
opinion in Watson, however, Justice O'Connor stated baldly:
Although we have said that an employer has "the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question," Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432,
91 S.Ct. at 854, such formulation should not be interpreted as im-
plying that the ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the de-
fendant. On the contrary, the ultimate burden of proving that
discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a
specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all
times.38
8
Her use of the word "should" here is a curious irony. No citation or
support is offered for such a conclusion; nearly all textbooks give the
exact interpretation that Justice O'Connor says we must not give
Griggs.3 8 9
A. Case History
In August 1973, Clara Watson, a black woman, was hired by Fort
Worth Bank & Trust as a proof operator. In January 1976, Watson was
promoted to teller in the bank's drive-in facility. Between January 1980
385. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Exploring the 'Entire Spectrum' of Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 39; Max-
ine N. Eichner, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work Challenging Gender Biases in
the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991); Barbara J. Flagg,
"I Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discrimina-
tory Intent, 91 MicHi. L. REv. 953 (1993); Julia Lambert, Discretionary Decision Making: The
Application of Title VII's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 869; David B. Oppen-
heimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993); Herman Schwartz, The 1986
and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524
(1987); Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong?
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785.
386. See, e.g., Michael E. Gold, Griggs Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommenda-
tion for Reform, 7 INDuS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985).
387. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
388. Watson, 487 U.S. at 997.
389. PATRICK CIHON & JAMES CASTAGNERE, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 304-05
(1988); JAMES LEDVINKA & VIDA G. SCARPELLO, FEDERAL REGULATION OF PERSONNEL
AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 45-50 (1992); MACK PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 164-65 (2d ed. 1981).
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and February 1981, Watson sought four promotions and was denied all
four in favor of white employees. The bank, which had about eighty
employees, had not developed formal criteria for evaluating candidates
for the positions for which Watson unsuccessfully applied. Instead, it
relied upon the subjective judgment of the supervisors who were ac-
quainted with the candidates and with the natures of the jobs to be filled.
All the bank supervisors involved in the four promotions at issue were
white.390
Watson ified a discrimination charge with the EEOC. After exhaust-
ing her administrative remedies, she brought suit in federal district court.
As to Watson's individual claims, the district court applied the eviden-
tiary standards developed for disparate treatment cases. Watson was
held to have established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, but
the court held that the bank had successfully met its rebuttal burden of
presenting legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the
challenged promotions.391 The district court concluded that Watson had
failed on rebuttal to show that the reasons were pretexts for racial dis-
crimination and dismissed the action.
On appeal, Watson argued that the lower court had improperly failed
to apply the "disparate impact" analysis to her claims of discrimination
in promotion. A majority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel
held that "a Title VII challenge to an allegedly discretionary promotion
system is properly analyzed under the disparate treatment model rather
than the disparate impact model. '392 For this conclusion, the panel cited
Fifth Circuit precedent.393 Other circuits, notably the Ninth, the Elev-
enth, and the D.C., have held otherwise.394 Thus, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the split between the circuits.395
B. The Plurality Opinion in Watson
Very narrowly read, the Watson decision stands for the proposition
that disparate impact analysis is appropriate for subjective hiring and
promotion decisions.396 After all, it was to resolve a conflict between
circuits on that question that the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
390. Watson, 487 U.S. at 982.
391. lId at 983.
392. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 'Tust, 798 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1986).
393. Id.
394. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477,1485 (9th Cir. 1987)(en banc).
395. Watson, 487 U.S. at 984-85.
396. Some commentators who identified with the Reagan agenda saw the Watson decision
as supporting a much broader reading. See e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, The Reagan
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Eight justices concurred in that result; only four justices, O'Connor in-
cluded, subscribed to her far-reaching dicta on burdens of production
and persuasion.
In Watson, Justice O'Connor was allegedly providing guidance for
the district court if and when it would retry the case on remand, since the
first order of business for the Fifth Circuit was to determine whether a
disparate impact case had been established under the Court's revised
guidelines.397 However, O'Connor appeared to deliberately blur the
opinion so that it may appear to apply to all disparate impact cases
thereafter and not just the subjective hiring and promotion cases. For
instance, O'Connor stated: "We have cautioned that these shifting bur-
dens are meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging the presenta-
tion of evidence: 'The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at
all times with the plaintiff.' ,,3"s It is a small but important point that
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,399 the case cited for
the above proposition, was a disparate treatment case. Similarly, a few
pages later in the opinion, O'Connor tossed out this line: "Our previous
decisions offer guidance, but today's extension of disparate impact analy-
sis calls for a fresh and somewhat closer examination of the constraints
that operate to keep that analysis within its proper bounds. ' '4°° The cu-
mulative force of this opinion leaves the impression - blurry and not
easily supported by citation - that the Supreme Court in Watson had
issued new and for the first time definitive guidelines for the burden of
proof in all disparate impact cases.4 ° '
In dissent, Justice Blackmun seemed unsure as to whether the plural-
ity's standards reached only subjective hiring and promotion cases or
whether the attempt was to carve out brand new standards for all dispa-
rate impact cases. In any event, even if we take a narrow reading, Black-
mun pointed out that an employer need only add a few subjective factors
to the hiring/promotion criteria in order to undercut the stricter stan-
dards established by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4'
Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge for the Future, 42 VAry. L. Rv. 993, 997-
98 (1989).
397. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000.
398. Id. at 986.
399. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
400. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (footnote omitted).
401. Leading Cases, 102 HARv. L. REv. 143, 316-17 (1988).
402. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1009-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
[Vol. 77:645
1994] THE WINDING. ROAD TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 705
As noted above, the plurality decision in Watson borrowed language
from disparate treatment cases and applied the quotes directly to the
case at bar. Other instances of blurring the distinction between the two
types of cases included characterizing the employer's burden as one of
"production" that required it to articulate "a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason" for rejecting the plaintiff.403
C. Old Hostility & Bad History
Both O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson and White's majority
opinion in Wards Cove reflect old hostilities toward the concept of dispa-
rate impact. Justice White, a member of the unanimous Court that de-
cided Griggs, has since drifted away from his concurrence and now,
according to one commentator, embraces the argument that Title VII
does not authorize relief for protecting groups as groups.4" To elabo-
rate, Justice White would have held - if he could have gotten the votes
- that only individual blacks and other direct victims of discrimination
could benefit from remedial orders, and that federal judges should not
order (and unions and employers violate the law if they adopt) the
awarding of job opportunities by racial quota.4 °5 As some have argued,
the logic of Griggs presents a limited set of options, starting with criteria
validation, moving through to self-correction as measured by result, to
the imposition of quotas." 6 Since, according to one authority, all job
opportunities are subject to chance and arbitrariness, if not outright ca-
price, Griggs had unavoidably moved the nation toward imposition of
quotas407 and threatened the well-being of the Republic."°
The hostility of some respected commentators to Griggs and affirma-
tive action in general seems based on this notion that both are inextrica-
bly linked to numerical quotas. This observation is true not only for
jurists such as White, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, but also for politicians
such as Bush, Reagan, Reynolds, and Meese. This coupling may have
originated in 1975 with the publication of Affirmative Discrimination:
Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy by Nathan Glazer, a sociologist.4°9
403. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (cited in Leading
Cases, supra note 401, at 315 n.47).
404. Liebman, supra note 308, at 481.
405. Id at 482.
406. Id. at 474.
407. Id. at 473-74.
408. Id. at 486.
409. NATHAN GLAZER, ArIntRATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY & PUBLIC
POLICY Xi, 33-76 (1978).
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Such linkage has been continued in recent law review observations as
"[q]uotas and adverse impact [disparate impact] are practically synony-
mous."410 The "link" between affirmative action and quotas, a virtual
buzzword41' for the Republican administrations since 1980, finally
emerged in a Supreme Court decision in 1988 when Justice O'Connor
endorsed it in her plurality opinion in Watson.4"2 Justice O'Connor then
used the retreat-into-quotas argument as the springboard for her revi-
sion of the evidentiary standards in Title VII disparate impact cases.4"3
In this passage, fully endorsed by a majority of the Court one year
later,414 the political rhetoric of the Reagan Administration finally found
its way into law.415
Some of the current hostility toward affirmative action in general and
Griggs specifically is based on Chicago School of Economics theory and
its commitment to efficiency.416 This libertarian and neo-classical devo-
tion to theories of supply and demand and free markets is anchored to
the assumptions of Adam Smith.41 7 Many of those underlying assump-
410. Gold, supra note 386, at 457.
411. See, e.g., Will, supra note 45.
412. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988), wherein Justice
O'Connor writes "They [Respondent and the United States - appearing as amicus curiae] also
argue that subjective selection practices would be so impossibly difficult to defend under dis-
parate impact analysis that employers would be forced to adopt numerical quotas in order to
avoid liability." Id.
413. Id. at 993-94.
Respondent and the United States are thus correct when they argue that extending
disparate impact analysis to subjective employment practices has the potential to create
a Hobson's choice for employers and thus to lead in practice to perverse results. If
quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of avoiding
expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely
adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are dis-
cussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful to ensure that the quotas are
met....
Because Congress has so clearly and emphatically expressed its intent that Title VII
not lead to this result [i.e., quotas], 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2(j), we think it imperative
to explain in some detail why the evidentiary standards that apply in these cases should
serve as adequate safeguards against the danger that Congress recognized.
Id.
414. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
415. For a contrary argument on the success of the Reagan administration on civil rights,
see Drew S. Days, III, The Courts' Response to the Reagan Civil Rights Agenda, 42 VAND. L.
REv. 1003 (1989).
416. For a critique, see Dawn Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. C. L.
REv. 235 (1971).
417. See R. Larry Reynolds & William A. Wines, The Ethical Implications of Various
Schools of Economic Thought (Aug. 7, 1992), (unpublished paper, presented at Society for
Business Ethics Meeting, Las Vegas, NV).
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tions are not realistic or are subject to criticism for both methodological
reasons418 and for reflecting value choices that are not morally
justifiable.419
The bad history, of course, was Justice O'Connor's insistence that
Griggs "should" not be read to shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ant after a statistical showing of disparate impact by the plaintiff, that the
defendant must show which specific employment practice caused the
complained-of discrimination, and that the ultimate legal issue in dispa-
rate impact is no different than in disparate treatment.420 Justice Black-
mun's opinion in Watson42 and Justice Stevens' dissent in Wards Cove422
adequately and persuasively document a very different history, one
which does not accord with Justice O'Connor's revisionist ideas.
D. Observations
Although courts in the wake of Griggs "routinely invalidated objec-
tive criteria that produced lower rates of hiring and advancement by mi-
norities in blue-collar jobs, selection decisions for professional and
managerial jobs, usually based upon subjective factors, remained largely
resistant to Title VII challenge. '423  One can, if so disposed, then read
the Watson-Wards Cove results in a Marxist way as insulating the oppres-
sor class from the leveling influences used against working-class employ-
ment discrimination. That noted, consider the conflicting underlying
moral values. White and O'Connor read Title VII to require mer-
itocratic, open opportunity, whereas Blackmun and Stevens argue for a
legacy of discrimination approach that embraces elements of compensa-
tory preferment.
This split has its roots in the subtle duality of the Griggs opinion it-
self. On one hand, the Griggs Court declared itself for merit by asserting
that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."'424 But the same
unanimous Court also endorsed the legacy of discrimination notions em-
418. See; e.g., Zimarowski, Radzicki, & Wines, An Institutionalist Perspective on Law and
Economics (Chicago style) in the Context of United States Labor Law, 35 Aniz. L. RE v. 397
(1993).
419. See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, The Poverty of Economics, Tim ATm c MoNrHBY, Feb.
1985, at 74-84.
420. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987, 993-98 (1988).
421. Id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
422. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
423. Leading Cases, supra note 401, at 309 (citing Bartholet, Application of Title VII to
Jobs in High Places, 95 H1Av. L. REv. 947, 952, 959-78 (1982)).
424. Id at 318 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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braced by Blackmun when it held that facially neutral practices adopted
without discriminatory intent may violate Title VII "if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."425
The Court also noted in Griggs that if blacks "have been denied educa-
tional opportunities in segregated schools, then literacy tests that deny
many the right to vote and written exams that deny others the chance to
earn a living handling coal tend to perpetuate past discrimination by as-
suring that those intentionally denied educational opportunities also lose
political and economic opportunities. '426 This conflict in the underlying
theories of Title VII has provided much of the grist for the political con-
flict between liberals and conservatives since 1980. Opposition to racial
quotas was a central belief of William Bradford Reynolds, Edwin Meese,
Ronald Reagan, and George Bush.427 This underlying philosophical
conflict suggests some of the basic divisions in theories of distributive
justice as well as in theories of ethics. The divisions are profound. The
debate between the majority and dissent in Watson-Wards Cove might be
better served by directly addressing these differences rather than obscur-
ing them with awkward attempts at reinterpretation of well-known
precedents.
A final observation is that the subjective-objective criteria for em-
ployment and promotion evidentiary standards seems generally unsatis-
factory as a legal classification standard. It is not a clean dichotomy, but
rather a continuum between two poles. In practice, courts might find the
distinction elusive and the factors mixed.4' However, after November
1991, Congressional action has eliminated these and other potential con-
fusions by reversing Watson and Wards Cove. We now turn to that
legislation.
VI. THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTs Acr
As part of a continuing effort to confront President Bush with the
emerging backlash from a decade of executive branch indifference and
hostility toward the enforcement of the employment discrimination laws,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, legislation that reversed
some of the more extreme decisions of the Rehnquist Court in the area
of Title VII. Surprisingly, this legislation was signed into law by Presi-
425. Id. at 319 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
426. Id at 320.
427. Stuart Taylor Jr., Breaking New Ground on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1986, at A28.
428. Patricia Patterson, The "Appropriate" Disparate Impact Case 13-14 (Apr. 14, 1989)
(unpublished manuscript).
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dent George Bush on November 21, 1991 "to end a bruising two-year
fight over job discrimination."429 Only the previous year, Bush vetoed a
very similar bill and watched an override attempt fail by one vote in the
Senate.430 The conflict between Congress and the administration cen-
tered on the perception that the impact of the proposed legislation
would reach farther than its stated objectives.
President Bush was heavily criticized for vetoing the 1990 version of
the Civil Rights Act. As re-election grew nearer, he appeared to em-
brace the 1991 version. However, changes in the 1991 version were
mostly cosmetic. They included the addition of a section on the foreign
employment of U.S. citizens,431 the formation of committees to study
and monitor the "glass ceiling" phenomena,432 and technical assistance
training.433 The most profound change was the elimination of explicit
retroactivity provisions.4  The ambiguity on this issue of retroactivity
appears to leave resolution to the discretion of the federal courts.435
Equally noteworthy was the attachment of a formal signing state-
ment by President Bush. Written by C. Boyden Gray, counsel to the
President, it included a passage that supported a memorandum written
by Senator Bob Dole of Kansas. The memorandum addressed the issue
of the use of "business necessity" as a defense for hiring discrimination,
and described the bill as an" 'affirmation of existing law,' including deci-
sions made by the Supreme Court. ' 436 The potential impact of the writ-
ten statement would be to reverse or minimize the effect of some
portions of the Act itself.
The purpose of the Act as stated in the bill was-
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimina-
tion and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
429. Andrew Rosenthal, Reaffirming Commitmen Bush Signs Rights Bill, N.Y. TMs,
Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
430. Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Walk Title VII, Section 1981, and the Inter-
section of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990,79 CAL. L. REv. 775 n.7 (1991). See
also SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 457-58 (Bush's change of mind on civil rights bill actually was
an acknowledgment that Congress had enough votes to override another veto); Michele A.
Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90
MicH. L. REv. 2035 (1992).
431. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077-78.
432. Id. §§ 201-03, 105 Stat. 1081-84.
433. Id. § 10, 105 Stat. 1078.
434. Estrin, supra note 430, at 2035-36.
435. Id. at 2036.
436. Andrew Rosenthal, President Tries to Quell Furor on Interpreting Scope of New Law,
N.Y. TImns, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
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(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job re-
lated" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 4 3 7 and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio;438 (3) to confirm statutory authority
and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate
impact suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;439 and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by ex-
panding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to pro-
vide adequate protection to victims of discrimination. 440
The executive branch and Congress had conflicting motives for pass-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The role that Congress saw for the Act
was to override the Supreme Court decisions that had narrowed the
scope of Title VII during 1988 and 1989 and to provide for damages in
cases of intentional employment discrimination. The executive branch
saw the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as an opportunity to improve its image
before President Bush's bid for re-election.
The legislation has four main parts: Title I is the most important and
addresses federal civil rights remedies; Title II speaks to glass ceiling is-
sues; Title III (the longest title) extends civil rights to Senate employees
and establishes the Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices; and Ti-
tle IV has two general provisions - one on severability of the provisions
in the Act and a second on the effective date. The major issues ad-
dressed in the Act are:
(1) The recovery of punitive damages in cases of intentional discrim-
ination in employment. Punitive damages have limitations outlined in
the Act and go beyond relief afforded by § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
(2) The burden of proof in cases that involve disparate impact is the
responsibility of the respondent. The employer must prove that the chal-
lenged practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
(3) A prohibition against the use, or the adjustment of test scores to
discriminate in employment for reasons of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(4) The prompt resolution of challenges to employment practices us-
ing litigation, consent judgments, or court orders.
437. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
438. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
439. 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.
440. Civil Rights Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071.
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(5) Protection of U.S. citizens employed extra-territorially in accord-
ance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990.
(6) Sections 110 and 111 address the issues of training, education,
and outreach.
(7) Title II of the Act addresses the continuing issue of the "glass
ceiling" effect in limiting the promotion of women and minorities. It
establishes a committee to study the issue and make recommendations
concerning the elimination of artificial barriers to the advancement of
women and minorities.
(8) '1'itle III, wherein the Senate makes itself subject to the Act with
detailed limitations, does not fall within the scope of this Article and will
not be discussed further." 1
The 1991 Civil Rights Act directly addressed the Supreme Court's
rulings in a number of decisions. A short summary of the decisions
which were affected would include:
a. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.' 2 Although some com-
mentators have expressed doubts,443 most read the Act as revers-
ing the modifications of disparate impact doctrine contained in
Wards Cove. 4
b. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc..44- The Act allows a sen-
iority system that is thought to intentionally discriminate to be
challenged when it is adopted, when the parties become subject to
it, or when it actually affects the charging parties." 6 In Lorance,
the Court had limited challenges to the time when the system is
initiated.447
c. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.448 In the "mixed-motive" dis-
crimination cases, the Act prescribes injunctive relief against fu-
ture violations, declaratory relief, and attorney fees for the
plaintiff. Hiring, reinstatement, or promotion cannot be ordered.
The defendant can no longer walk away from the case by showing
it would have reached the same result in the absence of
discrimination. 449
441. Ia §§ 301-24, 105 Stat. 1088-99.
442. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
443. See, ag., C. Ray Gullett, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Did it Really Overturn Wards
Cove?, 43 LAB. L.J. 462 (1992).
444. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074.
445. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
446. § 112, 105 Stat. at 1078-79.
447. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 910.
448. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
449. §§ 102, 103, 105 Stat. at 1072-74.
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d. Martin v. Wilks.45° In this case, the Supreme Court held that
white firefighters who were not parties to an affirmative action
consent decree were not estopped from challenging it years later.
The Act prohibits such challenges if the parties had notice of the
judgment when made and a reasonable opportunity to present
their objections or if the parties were adequately represented in
the proceedings by others with similar interests.451
e. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.45 2 Under this ruling,
U.S. citizens employed outside the country by American firms
were excluded from Title VII coverage.45 3 Now, extra-territorial
coverage of citizens is specifically provided.454
f. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.5 Litigation
costs for Title VII purposes were held not to include expert wit-
ness fees.4 56 Now such fees are covered in addition to attorney's
fees.45
7
The 1987 rejection of Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court
should have been an early warning signal for the Bush Administration.
That action presaged the socially explosive Clarence Thomas - Anita Hill
confirmation hearings in the summer of 1991, which aroused public opin-
ion458 and foreshadowed the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Apparently, U.S. society and its elected Congress could no longer toler-
ate the Supreme Court's efforts to radically re-draft the protections that
had formerly been available to victims of employment discrimination.
Attachment of Gray's written statement represented a desperate
damage control measure by the Bush Administration. The vague word-
ing of the Act left a legacy of confusion over the issue of retroactivity.459
The point in question is whether the law applies retroactively to cases
450. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
451. § 108, 105 Stat. at 1076.
452. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
453. Arabian Am. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1235.
454. § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077.
455. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
456. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1143.
457. § 113, 105 Stat. 1079.
458. The divisiveness of the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings lingers on three years
later. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Who Lied?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 52. A current sur-
vey states that 40% of Americans surveyed believe that Justice Thomas sexually harassed
Anita Hill and 26% do not know. Id. See also Ellen Goodman, It's Been Three Years, But
Clarence Thomas vs. Anita Hill Still Matters, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 15, 1994, at 7A (column
written for the BOSTON GLOBE); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JuSTIcE: THE
SELLING OF CLARENE THOMAS (1994).
459. Whether the 1991 Civil Rights Act should be applied retroactively is a matter much
debated in the current literature. For a position in favor of retroactivity, see, Michele A.
Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90
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pending on the date of enactment. Since the passage of the Act, the
courts have been split on the issue of retroactivity.460
Historically, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its treat-
ment of this issue. In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,461 the
Court held that unless clearly worded otherwise, congressional enact-
ments would not be assumed retroactive.462 However, in Thorpe v.
Housing Authority of Durham,4 3 the Court applied new regulations ret-
roactively. It held that the appellate court must use the law in effect at
the time the decision is made. 4 The interjection of Dole's memoran-
dum by President Bush also served to muddy the waters. Because of
conflicting messages from the court system and the executive branch,
this issue is not likely to be resolved before it reaches the U.S. Supreme
Court.
465
Before Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,46 decisions regarding dis-
parate treatment were based on Griggs v. Duke Power.467 The enact-
ment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act restores common law to its state prior
to the Wards Cove decision. The Act also provides for punitive daiiaages
in cases of discrimination.468
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article synthesizes research done over the past eight years.
Ronald Reagan was President of the United States from January 1981 to
January 1989. In part, the withdrawal of funding for Title VII enforce-
ment may be a victim of its own success; that is, the lack of enthusiasm
on the part of the Administration to enforce Title VII may have caused
potential claimants to reconsider whether they wanted to file at all. This
drop in filings, in turn, may have caused the funding to more closely
approximate adequate levels by decreasing the number of cases being
processed. Why would victims of discrimination not file with the
MIcH. L. REv. 2035 (1992). But cf Thamer E. Temple III, Retroactivity of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act in Tie VII Cases, LAB. LJ. 299 (1992).
460. Estrin, supra note 430, at 2036.
461. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
462. Estrin, supra note 430, at 2038.
463. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
464. Estrin, supra note 430, at 2040.
465. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this issue in the October 1992
Term. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993).
466. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
467. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
468. § 102, 105 Stat. 1072-73.
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EEOC? Press accounts portray EEOC enforcement efforts as
inadequate.469
Personnel
The place to start when we talk of changes in enforcement from 1980
to 1989 is the U.S. Supreme Court:
OCrOBER 1980 OcrOBER 1989 OCrOBER 1993
CHIEF JUSTICE: Warren Burger William Rehnquist*# William Rehnquist
AssociATEs: William Brennan William Brennan** David Souter
Byron White Byron White**** Ruth Ginsburg
Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall*** Clarence Thomas
Harry Blackmun Harry Blackmun Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens John P. Stevens John P. Stevens
Potter Stewart Sandra O'Connor* Sandra O'Connor
William Rehnquist Antonin Scalia* Antonin Scalia
Lewis Powell Anthony Kennedy* Anthony Kennedy
*Indicates Reagan Appointee
#Indicates Reagan appointment to Chief Justice from Associate Justice
**Resigned on July 20, 1990. President Bush nominated David Souter of New
Hampshire.
***Resigned on June 27, 1991. President Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to replace
him.
****Resigned on March 19, 1993. President Clinton nominated Ruth Bader Ginsburg to
replace him.
In Title VII cases, the "liberal" votes - votes in favor of preserving and
expanding precedent - historically came from Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, sometimes joined by Justice Stevens.
Of course, much has been made of the fact that when President Rea-
gan left office in January 1989 he had appointed almost one-half of the
sitting federal judges.470 Although the Reagan Administration started
out with a vigorous ideological screening and did not suffer its first loss
in Senate judiciary confirmations until the nomination of Jefferson B.
Sessions on June 5, 1986, the conservative agenda was slowed in 1986
when the Democrats regained control of the Senate.471 Also, as Reagan
neared the end of his term, the Democrat-controlled Senate Judiciary
Committee moved slowly on nominations.4 72 This slow down was
matched by a slower administration pace in sending names to the com-
469. Congressional Study Says Job Bias Cases are Poorly Handled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1988, at A23.
470. Id.; Friedman & Wermiel, supra note 26 at 1; Stephen Wermeil, Tilting Bench: Rea-
gan Choices Alter the Makeup and Views of the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1.
471. Washington Whispers, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 17, 1986, at 13.
472., Wermiel, supra note 37, at Al.
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mittee.4 73 In the last two years of the Reagan term, the White House
emphasized nominations of experienced jurists in an attempt to keep
ammunition away from hostile Democrats.4 74
Yet, the imprint of the Reagan judges on the federal courts will be
evident for decades. For example, in a study performed by two political
scientists, Rowland and Karp, district court opinions for the years 1981-
85 revealed that Carter appointees voted for those claiming race bias
59% of the time versus 13% of the time for Reagan appointees.475 The
same study found that Carter appointees found bias against the handi-
capped 61% of the time compared to a 25% rate for Reagan appoin-
tees.476 Professors Rowland and Karp, in a study of criminal cases in
federal district courts (1981-1984), also found that Carter appointees
voted for the defendants 47% of the time; Nixon appointees found for
the defendants 32% of the time; and Reagan appointees found for the
defendants in only 24% of their rulings.477 My earlier study of three-
judge appellate court panels in Title VII cases suggested that there may
be no statistically significant difference in the way court of appeals
judges voted on employment discrimination cases.478
The substantial pace of progress against racism and sexism in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s slowed to a halt in the 1980s. Some
observers of United States society have openly debated whether the
Reagan Administration position on civil rights re-established an old-
fashioned racism.479 Although figures may vary widely depending on
definitions, the number of racist attacks in the United States according
to the Justice Department's community relations service increased from
99 in 1980 to 276 in 1986.480 In the face of such criticism, Administration
spokesmen, journalists, and even President Reagan himself claimed that
the Administration was merely trying to root out an invidious form of
discrimination manifested in affirmative action quotas, hiring prefer-
ences, and school busing orders.481
473. Id.
474. Washington Whispers, supra note 470, at 13.
475. Werniel, supra note 37.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
479. See eg., Friedrich, supra note 332, at 21; Steve France, "Hate Goes to College,"
A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 44.
480. Friedrich, supra note 332, at 20.
481. Joe Davidson & Linda M. Watkins, Jobs Debate" Quotas in Hiring are Anathema to
President Despite Minority Gain, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1985, at 1.
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Part of the problem with the so-called "Doctrine of Original Inter-
pretation" was that it attempted to return the U.S. to the legal thinking
of the 18th century. That kind of nostalgia is a soothing way to avoid
dealing with the complicated realities of a much more open and pluralis-
tic society in the last years of the 20th century.4s2 Similarly, any attempt
to return to the golden age of the civil rights movement from the late
1960s turns on the listener's belief in the existence of such an era. Some
argue that no such era existed and that chief among those who did not
share a "colorblind vision" of America in the 1960s was Ronald Reagan,
who vociferously opposed both the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965
Voting Rights Act." 3
There is some comfort in the statistical part of this study for those of
us on the political left because President Reagan's attempt to clone the
judiciary in the image of his Chief Justice appointee, William Rehnquist,
has not been entirely successful. On Title VII cases, using an admittedly
small sample of cases, there was no statistically significant relationship,
using a chi-square test, between voting pattern and Presidential appoint-
ment. There certainly seems to be some trend in the direction of voting
for business and against civil rights on the part of Reagan's appointees.
President Reagan's judicial appointees tended to be heavily male, Re-
publican, and wealthy; that tendency existed to a degree not recently
matched by other Presidents.
Additionally, we can state confidently that President Reagan's at-
tempt to put his stamp on affirmative action law through a vigorous cam-
paign orchestrated by Mr. Meese and the Justice Department did not
directly bear fruit. Professor Tribe's observations on the unpredictable
behavior of Supreme Court appointees,' 4 especially on issues not at the
top of the screening list, appears to be supported by the voting patterns
of Justice O'Connor.
Statistically, President Reagan had unheralded success in stifling the
vigor of Title VII enforcement in this country by tightening the purse
strings at a time when his Justice Department policies against class ac-
tions and in favor of litigation had created a demand for greater funding
to maintain law enforcement effectiveness. Additionally, and we are not
able to support this with conclusive statistics but only by an anecdotal
482. See GAiL SI-mEHY, CHARACrER: AmEwcA's SEARCH FOR LEADERSHIP 237-84
(1990).
483. Michael Kinsley, On Civil Rights, Conservative Can't Means Won't, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1985, at 29.
484. TRIBE, supra note 15.
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approach, the Reagan Administration seems to have had a dramatic but,
perhaps, short-lived impact on social attitudes by legitimatizing anti-af-
firmative action attitudes. Some of the people in our society may also
have sensed that it was politically acceptable to be openly hostile to wo-
men and minorities in the workplace. To the extent that such attitudes
had their genesis in Reagan policies, they may be the most insidious and,
perhaps, damaging legacy Ronald Reagan left in the Title VII area.
My initial data indicated the possibility that the most dramatic under-
mining of civil rights in the Title VII area during the Reagan Administra-
tion had occurred in funding for the agency. The perceptions of
increased sexism and racism aside, the funding for EEOC enforcement
of Title VII, adjusted for inflation and case load, was down 35.4% be-
tween fiscal years 1979 and 1984. Since 1984, however, the EEOC budg-
ets have reflected a very small growth in real terms. In absolute terms,
the growth is 11% over four years. However, there has been a falling off
in the number of complaints received, which results in a slight increase in
real terms adjusted for case load. Most, about three-quarters, of the in-
crease in real dollars for enforcement per thousand cases is due to the
drop in the number of complaints. The restrained enforcement effort
may have helped produce the drop in complaints as employees despaired
of help from the EEOC.4
To summarize, my conclusions are: (1) that careful ideological
screening of federal judicial candidates did not assure President Reagan
the "correct" votes on Title VII cases in the short run as measured by
conservative ideology; (2) that as late as 1989, Supreme Court decisions
did not reflect President Reagan's agenda for Title VII because the
makeup of the Court had not changed sufficiently to enable the con-
servative wing to control results and because, despite excellent conserva-
tive credentials, Justice O'Connor had voted with the liberal wing on
employment discrimination issues, thereby breaking up the voting block
that formerly had given control of Title VII cases to Justice White; (3)
that the full impact of President Reagan's appointments to the federal
bench may not be known for a decade or more due to the glacial pace of
implementing policy change through judicial personnel changes; and (4)
that despite the loud and often acrimonious debates over civil rights that
occurred between 1980 and 1989, the two most significant impacts of the
Reagan years on Title VII enforcement appear to have been the ap-
pointment of lower federal court judges who were not sympathetic to
485. David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, "Outcomes of Sexual Harassment Charges,"
AcAD. oF MGMT. J., 185, 191 (1988).
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claims of discrimination in critical fact-finding situations (i.e. at trial) and
the quiet syphoning of funds away from EEOC enforcement efforts at a
time when administration policies were creating an environment that
called for more enforcement rather than less. If anything, the intense
publicity that accompanied some of the more heated policy debates and
more controversial appointments provided a tactical diversion by dis-
tracting public attention and inquiry from funding and administrative di-
rection of the enforcement agency. The federal "ship of state" in this
modem era is much like a supertanker. President Reagan's turn at the
helm has changed the ship's course dramatically in the area of Title VII
interpretation and enforcement. There is no doubt that it took all of the
first term and part of the second to overcome the inertia holding us on
the course set in the 1960s and 1970s. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 re-
versed some of the more extreme case results in exchange for caps on
some damages, thereby adjusting our heading. Just how profound the
course change will be and how long the helm will stay on this course may
not be fully understood until well into the next century.
The battles over the nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court may well have sounded an alarm that
triggered a social backlash. Ultimately, a popular President and his heir
were not able to convert the judicial appointment power into'a judicial
repeal of a large part of our employment discrimination laws. Such a
radical revision reflecting an ideological extremism lacked fundamental
support in the mainstream of U.S. society.486 Ironically, the failure of
the Bork nomination should have alerted the Reagan-Bush White House
that any substantial repeal of rules for employment fairness had to origi-
nate with the people and their popularly elected representatives in Con-
gress, not with executive branch appointees.
486. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMEmi-
CAN ELEc'ORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERmATH (1990) (advancing the thesis that a populist
center has held in American politics for over 100 years keeping liberal and conservative fac-
tions from pulling government policies to radical extremes).
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